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Abstract: We derive, in the classical framework of Bayesian sensitivity
analysis, optimal lower and upper bounds on posterior values obtained from
Bayesian models that exactly capture an arbitrarily large number of finite-
dimensional marginals of the data-generating distribution and/or that are
as close as desired to the data-generating distribution in the Prokhorov
or total variation metrics; these bounds show that such models may still
make the largest possible prediction error after conditioning on an arbi-
trarily large number of sample data measured at finite precision. These
results are obtained through the development of a reduction calculus for
optimization problems over measures on spaces of measures. We use this
calculus to investigate the mechanisms that generate brittleness/robustness
and, in particular, we observe that learning and robustness are antagonistic
properties. It is now well understood that the numerical resolution of PDEs
requires the satisfaction of specific stability conditions. Is there a missing
stability condition for using Bayesian inference in a continuous world under
finite information?
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1. Introduction
With the advent of high-performance computing, Bayesian methods are increas-
ingly popular tools for the quantification of uncertainty throughout science and
industry. Since these methods impact the making of sometimes critical decisions
in increasingly complicated contexts, the sensitivity of their posterior conclu-
sions with respect to the underlying models and prior beliefs is becoming a
pressing question.
While it is known that Bayesian methods are robust and consistent when the
number of possible outcomes is finite, the exploration of Bayesian inference in
∗Corresponding author.
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a continuous world has revealed both positive [19, 30, 38, 67, 69, 92, 96] and
negative results [12, 13, 35, 47, 48, 61, 71]. One contribution of this paper is
the development of a calculus for the elucidation of the mechanisms generating
robustness or brittleness in Bayesian inference. In particular, this paper
1. shows that the process of Bayesian conditioning on data at fine enough
resolution is sensitive (as defined in [94], modulo a small technicality)
with respect to the underlying distributions, under the total variation and
Prokhorov metrics; and
2. raises the question of a missing stability condition for using Bayesian in-
ference in a continuous world under finite information, somewhat akin to
the CFL condition for the stability of a discrete numerical scheme used to
approximate a continuous PDE.
Point (1) is the source of negative results similar to those caused by tail proper-
ties in statistics [8, 37], and can be seen as an extreme occurrence of the dilation
phenomenon from robust Bayesian inference [103].
Let us now illustrate the main question explored in this paper with a simple
example of Bayesian reasoning in action:
Problem 1. There is a bag containing 102 coins, one of which always lands on
heads, while the other 101 are perfectly fair. One coin is picked uniformly at
random from the bag, flipped 10 times, and 10 heads are obtained. What is the
probability that this coin is the unfair coin?
The correct probability is given by applying Bayes’ theorem:
P[A|B] = P[B|A]P[A]
P[B]
=
1
1 + 101× 2−10 ≈ 0.91, (1)
where A is the event “the coin is the unfair coin” and B is the event “10 heads
are observed”. If the number of coins is not known exactly and the supposedly
fair coins are not exactly fair, then Bayes’ theorem can be used to produce a
robust Bayesian inference in the following sense: if the fair coins are slightly
unbalanced and the probability of getting a tail is 0.51, and an estimate of 100
coins is used and an estimate 12 of the fairness of the fair coins is used, then
the resulting estimate 11+99×2−10 is still a good approximation of the correct
answer.
Does this robustness hold when the underlying probability space is continuous
or an approximation thereof? For example, what if the random outcomes are
decimal numbers — perhaps given to finite precision — rather than heads or
tails?
1.1. The general question
To investigate these questions in a general context let us now consider the sit-
uation in which the space X where observations/samples take their values is
no longer {Head,Tail} but an arbitrary Polish space (with the real line R as a
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prototypical example). Write M(X ) for the set of probability measures on X
and let Φ: M(X ) → R be a function1 defining a quantity of interest. When X
is the real line R, a prototypical example is Φ(µ) := µ[X ≥ a], the probability
that the random variable X distributed according to µ exceeds the threshold
value a; another typical example is Φ(µ) := Eµ[X ], the mean of X .
Problem 2. Let the data-generating distribution µ† ∈ M(X ) be an unknown
or partially known probability measure on X . The objective is to estimate
Φ(µ†) from the observation of n i.i.d. samples from µ†, which we denote by
d = (d1, . . . , dn) ∈ Xn.
For practical reasons (and to avoid problems associated with conditioning
with respect to events of measure zero) we will assume that the data is observed
up to resolution/precision δ > 0, i.e. what we actually observe in Problem 2 is
the event d ∈ Bnδ , where Bnδ :=
∏n
i=1 Bδ(xi), (x1, . . . , xn) is a fixed point of Xn,
and Bδ(x) is the open ball of radius δ and center x (defined with respect to a
consistent metric on the Polish space X ).
Now observe that the Bayesian answer to Problem 2 is to assume that µ† is
the realization of some random measure µ onM(X ). This is done by choosing a
model class A ⊆M(X ) and a probability measure π ∈M(A) which we call the
prior. This prior determines the randomness with which a representative µ ∈ A
is selected, and for each such µ ∈ A, the generation of n i.i.d. samples d ∈ Xn by
randomly sampling from µn naturally determines a product measure on A×Xn.
In analogy to Problem 1, A plays the role of the bag of coins (measures) and
each measure µ ∈ A plays the role of a coin.
Now the prior estimate of the quantity of interest is Eµ∼π [Φ(µ)] and the
posterior estimate is defined as the conditional expectation
Eµ∼π,d∼µn [Φ(µ)|d ∈ Bnδ ] (2)
with respect to this product measure.
One response to the concern that the choice of prior π is somewhat arbitrary
is to explore classes of priors. Indeed:
“Most statisticians would acknowledge that an analysis is not complete unless the sensitiv-
ity of the conclusions to the assumptions is investigated. Yet, in practice, such sensitivity
analyses are rarely used. This is because sensitivity analyses involve difficult computations
that must often be tailored to the specific problem. This is especially true in Bayesian
inference where the computations are already quite difficult.” [102]
In this paper we will investigate this approach, known as robust Bayesian in-
ference [15, 16, 25, 104] or Bayesian sensitivity analysis, and examine the ro-
bustness of Bayesian inference by computing optimal bounds on prior and pos-
terior values in terms of given sets of priors. To do so, we need some defini-
tions.
1All spaces will be topological spaces, the term “function” will mean Borel measurable
function and “measure” will mean Borel measure.
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Definition 1.1. For a model classA ⊆M(X ), a quantity of interest Φ: A → R,
and a set of priors Π ⊆M(A), let
L(Π) := inf
π∈Π
Eµ∼π
[
Φ(µ)
]
U(Π) := sup
π∈Π
Eµ∼π
[
Φ(µ)
]
denote the optimal lower and upper bounds on the prior values of the quantity
of interest. For B ⊆ Xn a non-empty open subset of the data space, let ΠB ⊆ Π
be the subset of priors π such that the probability that d ∈ B is nonzero,
i.e. Pµ∼π,d∼µn [d ∈ B] > 0, and let
L(Π|B) := inf
π∈ΠB
Eµ∼π,d∼µn
[
Φ(µ)
∣∣d ∈ B]
U(Π|B) := sup
π∈ΠB
Eµ∼π,d∼µn
[
Φ(µ)
∣∣d ∈ B]
denote the optimal lower and upper bounds on the posterior values of the quan-
tity of interest, given that d ∈ B.
1.2. Example of brittleness under finite information
As illustrated in Problem 1, it is already known from classical Bayesian sensi-
tivity analysis that posterior values are robust if the random outcomes live in a
finite space (i.e. X is finite) or if the class of priors Π is finite-dimensional (i.e. if
what one does not know can be represented by a finite number of known param-
eters). One purpose of this paper is to investigate what the very same classical
Bayesian sensitivity analysis framework would conclude in the presence of finite
information (i.e. if for instance Π is finite codimensional). To understand this
question let us consider the following example:
Example 1.2. Our purpose is to estimate the mean Φ(µ†) := Eµ† [X ] of some
random variableX with respect to some unknown distribution µ† on the interval
[0, 1] based on the observation of n i.i.d. samples d := (d1, . . . , dn), given to finite
resolution δ (i.e. we observe d ∈ Bnδ , where Bnδ is the product of n open balls of
radius δ), from the unknown distribution µ†.
The Bayesian answer to that problem is to assume that µ† is the realization
of some random measure distributed according to some prior π (i.e. µ ∼ π) and
then compute the posterior value of the mean by conditioning on the data, i.e.
compute (2) with Φ(µ) := Eµ[X ]. Observe that to specify the prior π we need
to specify the distribution of all the moments2 of µ (i.e. the distribution of the
infinite-dimensional vector (Eµ[X ],Eµ[X
2],Eµ[X
3], . . .)).
It is known, from classical robust Bayesian inference, that the posterior value
(2) is robust with respect to finite dimensional perturbations of the particu-
lar choice of the prior π. However, rather than specifying a finite-dimensional
2In fact, this is a necessary but not a sufficient condition to determine pi, since there are
cases in which the moment problem is indeterminate. See [3] for a full discussion of such issues.
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class of priors Π (i.e. assuming infinite information), it appears epistemolog-
ically more reasonable to specify a finite-codimensional Π (i.e. assume finite
information) and a natural way to do so is to specify the distribution Q of only
a large, but finite, number of moments of µ (i.e. to specify the distribution of
(Eµ[X ],Eµ[X
2], . . . ,Eµ[X
k]), where k ∈ N can be arbitrarily large). This defines
a class of priors Π on M([0, 1]) such that if π ∈ Π and µ ∼ π then
(Eµ[X ],Eµ[X
2], . . . ,Eµ[X
k]) ∼ Q.
More precisely, writing Ψ as the function mapping each measure µ on [0, 1] to its
first k moments Ψ(µ) := (Eµ[X ],Eµ[X
2], . . . ,Eµ[X
k]) and choosing a measure
Q on Ψ(M([0, 1])) ⊂ Rk, Π is simply defined as the pullback of the measure Q
under Ψ, i.e. writing A :=M([0, 1]),
Π := Ψ−1Q =
{
π ∈ M(A) | Ψπ = Q}.
One consequence of one of the main results of this paper, Theorem 4.13, is that
no matter how large k is, no matter how large the number of samples n is, for
any Q that has a density with respect to the uniform distribution on the first k
moments, if you observe the data at a fine enough resolution, then the minimum
and maximum of the posterior value of the mean over the class of priors Π are
0 and 1, i.e. the following proposition holds.
Proposition 1.3. For all k ∈ N, if Q is absolutely continuous with respect to
the uniform distribution on Ψ(M([0, 1])), then
lim
δ↓0
L(Π|Bnδ ) = 0 and lim
δ↓0
U(Π|Bnδ ) = 1
and the convergence holds uniformly in n.
This example of brittleness is derived from Theorem 4.13 (see Example 4.16),
the proof of which sheds light on the mechanism leading to brittleness in a gen-
eral context and shows that the pathology illustrated by Proposition (1.3) is
general and inherent to using Bayesian inference in continuous spaces (or their
discretizations) under finite information. Furthermore, although this simple ex-
ample concerns the posterior mean, the quantity of interest in Theorem 4.13 is
arbitrary and the brittleness results apply to the whole posterior distribution.
1.3. Example of brittleness under infinitesimal model perturbations
Theorem 4.13 (and its corollary, Theorem 6.1), which leads to brittleness under
finite information as illustrated in the previous example, also leads to brittleness
under infinitesimal model perturbations in the total variation and Prokhorov
metrics. We will now illustrate one mechanism causing brittleness with a simple
example.
In this example we are interested in estimating Φ(µ†) = Eµ† [X ] where µ† is an
unknown distribution on the unit interval (X = [0, 1]) based on the observation
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(a) fa(x, θ) (b) fb(x, θ)
Fig 1. Illustration of the density fa(x, θ) of model a and fb(x, θ) of model b.
of a single data point d1 = 0.5 up to resolution δ (i.e. we observe d1 ∈ Bδ(x1)
with x1 = 0.5).
Consider the following two Bayesian models (measures) µa(θ) and µb(θ) on
the unit interval [0, 1], parametrized by θ ∈ (0, 1). The density fa of µa is given
by
fa(x, θ) = (1− θ)(1 + 1
θ
)
(1− x) 1θ + θ(1 + 11−θ )x 11−θ .
The density f b of µb is almost the same as fa: for θ ≥ 0.999, we set f b(x, θ) =
fa(x, θ); but, for θ < 0.999, we set
f b(x, θ) = fa(x, θ)
1
Z
(
1{x 6∈(x1− δc2 ,x1+ δc2 )} + 10
−9
1{x∈(x1− δc2 ,x1+ δc2 )}
)
,
where Z ≈ 1 is a normalization constant so that ∫ 1
0
f b(x, θ) dx = 1. See Figure 1
for an illustration of these densities.
Observe that the density of model b is that of model a besides the small
gap of width δc > 0 created around the data point for model b (if θ < 0.999,
see Figure 1); since the data point is fixed at x1 =
1
2 , the total variation dis-
tance dTV(µ
a(θ), µb(θ)) between the two models is, uniformly over θ ∈ (0, 1),
a constant times δc. Assuming that the prior distribution on θ is the uniform
distribution on (0, 1), observe that the prior value of the quantity of interest
Eµ[X ] under both models (a and b) is approximately
1
2 . Now, when θ is close
to one (zero) then the density of model a puts most of its mass towards one
(zero). Observe also that the density of model b behaves in a similar way, with
the important exception that the probability of observing the data under model
b is infinitesimally small for θ < 0.999. Therefore, for δ < δc, the posterior value
of the quantity of interest Eµ[X ] under model a is
1
2 whereas it is close to one
under model b. Observe also that a perturbed model c analogous to b would
lead to a posterior value close to zero.
This simple example of brittleness under infinitesimal model perturbations
is derived from the proof of Theorem 6.4, which shows that Bayesian posterior
values are generally brittle under infinitesimal perturbations of Bayesian models
in TV and in Prokhorov metrics.
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µb(θ) is also a simple example of what worst priors can look like after a classi-
cal Bayesian sensitivity analysis over a class of priors specified via constraints on
the TV or Prokhorov distance or the distribution of a finite number of moments.
Can we dismiss these worst priors because they depend on the data? The
problem with this argument is that in the context of Bayesian sensitivity analysis
worst priors always depend on (or are pre-adapted to) the data. Therefore the
same argument would lead to a dismissal of Bayesian sensitivity analysis and
therefore the robust Bayesian framework. Can we dismiss these worst priors
because they depend too much on the data? The problem with this argument
is that it is not a transparent task to define too much without introducing the
following element of circular reasoning: the degree of pre-adaptation determines
the degree of brittleness, the framework is dismissed is when the degree of pre-
adaptation is “too much”, therefore the method cannot be brittle.
Can we dismiss these worst priors because they can “look nasty” and make the
probability of observing the data very small? The problem with this argument is
that these worst priors are not “isolated pathologies” but directions of instability
and their number increase with the number of data points. We will illustrate
this point with another simple example by placing a uniform constraint on the
probability of observing the data in the model class. We already know that if the
data is equally likely under all measures in the model class then posterior values
are robust but learning is not possible (prior and posterior values are equal).
The following example will show that although variations in the probability of
the data in the model class make learning possible, they also lead to brittleness.
1.4. Example of learning vs robustness
In this example we are interested in estimating Φ(µ†) = µ†[a, 1] for some a ∈
(0, 1), where µ† is an unknown distribution on the unit interval (X = [0, 1])
based on the observation of n data point d1, . . . , dn up to resolution δ (i.e. we
observe di ∈ Bδ(xi) with xi ∈ [0, 1] for i = 1, . . . , n).
Our purpose is to examine the sensitivity of the Bayesian answer to this
problem with respect to the choice of a particular prior. Consider the model
class
A :=M([0, 1]), (3)
and the class of priors
Π :=
{
π ∈ M(A) ∣∣Eµ∼π[Eµ[X ]] = m} .
Observe that Π corresponds to the assumption that µ† is the realization of a
random measure on [0, 1] whose mean is on average m.
As in the previous example, the finite codimensional class of priors Π leads
to brittleness in the sense that the least upper bound on prior values is
U(Π) = m
a
, (4)
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whereas, for δ ≪ 1/n, the least upper bound on posterior values (using Defini-
tion 1.1) is the deterministic supremum of the quantity of interest (over A), i.e.
U(Π|Bnδ ) = 1. (5)
Furthermore, worst priors are obtained by selecting priors for which the proba-
bility of observing the data µn[Bnδ ] is arbitrarily close to zero except when Φ(µ)
is close to its deterministic supremum. The bound on prior values (4) is obtained
from theorems 3.6 and 3.11 in Examples 3.7 and 3.15. The bound on posterior
values (5) is obtained from theorems 4.8 and 4.13 in Examples 4.9 and 4.16.
Can this brittleness be avoided by adding a uniform constraint on the prob-
ability of observing the data in the model class? To investigate this question let
us introduce α ≥ 1 and a probability measure µ0 on [0, 1] with strictly positive
Lebesgue density (with a prototypical example being that µ0 is itself uniform
measure on [0, 1]), consider the (new) model class
A(α) :=
{
µ ∈M[0, 1]
∣∣∣∣ 1αµn0 [Bnδ ] ≤ µn[Bnδ ] ≤ αµn0 [Bnδ ]
}
, (6)
and the (new) class of priors
Π(α) :=
{
π ∈M(A(α)) ∣∣Eµ∼π[Eµ[X ]] = m} . (7)
Note that, for the model class A(α), the probability of observing the data
is uniformly bounded below by 1
α
µn0 [B
n
δ ] and above by αµ
n
0 [B
n
δ ]. Therefore, for
α = 1, the probability of observing the data is uniform in the model class,
prior values are equal to posterior values, and the method is robust but learning
is impossible. If α slightly deviates from 1, then the calculus developed in this
paper allows us to compute the least upper bound on posterior values and obtain
that
lim
δ→0
U(Π(α)|Bnδ ) = 11 + 1
α2
a−m
m
=
m
a
α2
+m(1− 1
α2
)
. (8)
We refer to Example 4.10 for the derivation of (8) from Theorem 4.8.
Note that the right hand side of (8) is equal to m/a for α = 1 (when the
probability of the data is constant on the model class) and quickly converges
towards 1 as α increases. As a numerical application observe that for a = 34 and
m = a2 =
3
8 , we have limδ→0 U(Π(α)) = 12 and
lim
δ→0
U(Π(α)|Bnδ ) = 11 + 1
α2
Therefore, for α = 2, we have (irrespective of the number of data points)
lim
δ→0
U(Π(2)|Bnδ ) = 0.8,
and for α = 10, we have (irrespective of the number of data points)
lim
δ→0
U(Π(10)|Bnδ ) ≈ 0.99.
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Moreover, if α is derived by assuming the probability of each data point to
be known up to some tolerance γ, i.e. if the model class A(α) is replaced by
Aγ :=
{
µ ∈M[0, 1]
∣∣∣∣ 1γ µ0[Bδ(xi)] ≤ µ[Bδ(xi)] ≤ γµ0[Bδ(xi)] for i = 1, . . . , n
}
(9)
for some γ > 1, then it can be shown that
lim
δ→0
U(Π|Bnδ ) =
1
1 + 1
γ2n
,
which exponentially converges towards 1 as the number n of data points goes
to infinity.
In conclusion, the effects of a uniform constraint on the probability of the
data under finite information in the model class show that learning ability comes
at the price of loss in stability in the following sense: when α = 1, the data is
equiprobable under all measures in the model class, posterior values are equal
to prior values, the method is robust but learning is not possible. As α deviates
from one, the learning ability increases as robustness decreases, and when α is
large, learning is possible but the method is brittle.
1.5. Missing stability condition for using Bayesian inference under
finite information
The previous examples have shown that Bayesian inference can be unstable un-
der finite information, therefore, at the very least, the question of the existence
and of the nature of a stability condition for using Bayesian inference remains
to be answered. Indeed it is well known that numerical solutions of PDEs can
become unstable if specific stability conditions such as the CFL stability condi-
tion are not satisfied. Although numerical schemes that do not satisfy the CFL
condition may look grossly inadequate, the existence of such perverse examples
does not imply the dismissal of the necessity of a stability condition. Similarly,
although one may, as in Subsection 1.3, exhibit grossly perverse worst priors, the
existence of such priors does not invalidate the question of the missing stability
condition for using Bayesian inference under finite information.
The example provided in Subsection 1.4 suggests that, in the framework of
Bayesian sensitivity analysis, (i) such a stability condition would depend on how
well the probability of the data is known or constrained in the model class, and
(ii) learning and robustness are antagonistic/conflicting requirements — there is
no free lunch and increased learning potential is paid for by decreased stability
of posterior values.
Could this stability condition be derived from closeness in Kullback–Leibler
divergence? The problem with this approach is that closeness in Kullback–
Leibler divergence cannot be tested with discrete data and it requires the non-
singularity of the data generating distribution with respect to the model, which
could be a strong assumption for the certification the safety of a critical system.
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Indeed, when performing Bayesian analysis on function spaces, as is now in-
creasingly popular, for studying PDE solutions, results like the Feldman–Ha´jek
theorem [45, 56] tell us that most pairs of measures are mutually singular, and
hence at Kullback–Leibler distance infinity from one another. Another problem
with using Kullback–Leibler divergence is that a local sensitivity analysis (in the
sense of Fre´chet derivatives) of posterior values suggests infinite sensitivity as
the number of data point goes to infinity [54] (and this result is valid for the
broader class of divergences that includes the Hellinger distance).
A close inspection of some of the cases where Bayesian inference has been
successful shows the existence of a non-Bayesian feedback loop on the evaluation
of its performance [75, 77, 89]. Therefore one natural question is whether the
missing stability condition could be derived by exiting the strict framework
of Bayesian analysis/inference. According to Efron [43], without genuine prior
information
“Bayesian calculations cannot be uncritically accepted and should be checked by
other methods, which usually means frequentistically.”
1.6. Calculus for measures over measures
The results of this paper are derived from a calculus allowing us to solve/reduce
optimization problems with variables corresponding to measures over measures
over arbitrary Polish spaces. The following assertion of Theorem 3.11 is an
example of this calculus.
sup
π∈Ψ−1Q
Eµ∼π
[
Φ(µ)
]
= sup
Q∈Q
[
Eq∼Q
[
sup
µ∈Ψ−1(q)
Φ(µ)
]]
. (10)
In (10), Ψ is a measurable function mapping A (a Suslin subset of the setM(X )
of probability measures on a Polish space X ) into a separable metrizable space
Q, Q is a subset of M(Q), and Φ is a measurable quantity of interest defined
onM(X ). Therefore, (10) states that the optimization problem (in its left hand
side) over Ψ−1Q (a subset of the set of measures of A, i.e. a subset of the set of
measures of the set of measures overX ) is equal to the nesting of an optimization
problem over Ψ−1(q) (a subset of A, i.e. a subset of the set of measures over X )
and an optimization problem over Q (a subset of the set of measures over Q).
We will now illustrate this calculus by showing how (4) can be derived through
a simple application of (10). First we need to give a short reminder on optimiza-
tion over measures via the following problem.
Problem 3. A child is given one pound of playdoh and the seesaw illustrated
by Figure 2(a). How much mass can she put above the threshold a while keeping
the seesaw balanced at m?
The mathematical formulation of the question articulated in Problem 3 is
as follows. What is the least upper bound on P[X ≥ a] if P is an unknown
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(a) Problem 3 (b) Problems 4 and 5
Fig 2. Reduction of optimization problems over measures and over measures over measures.
(imperfectly known) probability measure on [0, 1] having mean m? The answer
to this question is
sup
µ∈A
µ[a, 1] (11)
where A is the set of probability measures on [0, 1] having mean m. Although
(11) is an infinite dimensional optimization problem over measures, it is easy to
see that to achieve the maximum, any mass put above a should be placed exactly
at a to create minimum leverage towards the right hand side of the seesaw and
any mass put below a should be placed at 0 to create maximum leverage towards
the left hand side of the seesaw (as illustrated in Figure 2(a)). This simple
argument allows to reduce (11) to a simple one dimensional problem whose
solution is m
a
and corresponds to Markov’s inequality. This simple example of
reduction calculus has a generalization to spaces of functions and measures
[82] and is based on a form of linear programming in spaces of measures. In
particular, the calculus developed in [82] uses results of Winkler [107] — which
follow from an extension of Choquet theory (see e.g. [84]) by von Weizsa¨cker
and Winkler [97, Corollary 3] to sets of probability measures with generalized
moment constraints — and a result of Kendall [64] characterizing cones, which
are lattice cones in their own order.
We will now consider the next level of complexity, illustrated by the following
two equivalent problems.
Problem 4. 10,000 children are, each, given one pound of playdoh and a seesaw.
On average, how much mass can they put above the threshold a while, on
average, keeping the seesaws balanced at m?
Problem 5. A child is given one pound of playdoh and a seesaw. What can
you say about how much mass she is putting above the threshold a if all you
have is the belief that she is keeping the seesaw balanced at m?
The mathematical formulation of problems 4 and 5 is as follows (for Prob-
lem 4, replace 10,000 by N and consider the asymptotic limit N → ∞). What
is the least upper bound on Eµ∼π[µ[X ≥ a]] if π is an unknown (imperfectly
known) probability measure onM([0, 1]) (the set of probability distributions on
[0, 1]) such that Eµ∼π[Eµ[X ]] = m?
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The answer to this question is
sup
π∈Π
Eµ∼π
[
µ[X ≥ a]], (12)
where Π is the set of measures of probability π on the set of measures of prob-
ability on [0, 1] such that Eµ∼π [Eµ[X ]] = m.
Although (12) is an optimization over measures over measures, the calculus
of (10) introduced in Theorem 3.11 allows us to reduce it to the nesting of two
optimization problems over measures as follows.
sup
π∈Π
Eµ∼π
[
µ[X ≥ a]] = sup
Q∈M([0,1]) :EQ[q]=m
Eq∼Q
[
sup
µ∈M([0,1]) :Eµ[X]=q
µ[X ≥ a]
]
.
(13)
Observe that (13) is obtained from (10) by taking X = [0, 1], Ψ(µ) = Eµ[X ],
Q = [0, 1] and Q as the set of measures of probability on Q having mean m. In
particular, note that in (13), the inner optimization problem involves taking a
supremum over all measures µ on [0, 1] having mean q and the outer optimization
problem involves taking a supremum over the probability distribution of q, i.e.
the set of distributions on [0, 1] having mean m. Solving the inner optimization
problem as described below Problem 3 leads to:
sup
π∈Π
Eµ∼π
[
µ[X ≥ a]] = sup
Q∈M([0,1]) : EQ[q]=m
Eq∼Q
[
min
( q
a
, 1
)]
,
and solving the outer optimization step gives the following solution.
sup
π∈Π
Eµ∼π
[
µ[X ≥ a]] = m
a
.
1.7. Structure of the paper and main results
This paper is structured as follows:
Section 2 incorporates Bayesian priors into the Optimal Uncertainty Quantifi-
cation (OUQ) framework [82]. In the OUQ framework, Uncertainty Quantifica-
tion (UQ) is formulated as an optimization problem (over an infinite-dimensional
set of functions and measures) corresponding to extremizing (i.e. finding worst
and best case scenarios) probabilities of failure or other quantities of interest,
subject to the constraints imposed by the scenarios compatible with the assump-
tions and information. In this generalization, priors are probability measures on
spaces of measures, and computing optimal bounds on prior values (given a
set of priors) requires solving problems in which the optimization variables are
measures on spaces of measures (the results of this paper can be extended to
measures over spaces of measures and functions but, for the sake of simplicity
and clarity, we will limit the presentation to measures over measures).
Section 3 shows how such optimization problems can, under general condi-
tions, be reduced to the nesting of two optimization problems over measures,
where then we can apply the reduction theorems of [82].
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Section 4 provides similar reduction theorems for the computation of optimal
bounds on posterior values given a set of priors and the observation of the data.
These reduction theorems lead to the brittleness results of Theorems 4.13, 6.4,
and 6.9.
Section 5 reviews questions of Bayesian consistency, inconsistency, model mis-
specification, and robustness through a motivating analysis and interprets the
results of this paper in relation to those questions.
Section 6 presents the brittleness under local misspecification results of The-
orems 6.4 and 6.9. That is, given a model, Theorem 6.4 provides optimal bounds
on posterior values for priors that are at arbitrarily small distance (in the
Prokhorov or total variation metrics) from a given model. Theorems 6.4 and
6.9 show that these optimal bounds on posterior values are the essential supre-
mum and infimum of the quantity of interest irrespective of the size of data and
of the size of the metric neighborhood around the model. Finally, Section 8 and
Appendix contain the proofs.
2. General set-up
2.1. Notation and conventions
Throughout, for a topological space Y, B(Y) will denote the Borel σ-algebra of
subsets of Y andM(Y) will denote the space of Borel probability measures gen-
erally endowed with the weak topology and the corresponding Borel σ-algebra
unless specified otherwise. For an alternative σ-algebra ΣY of subsets of Y the
set of probability measures on the σ-algebra ΣY will be denoted M(ΣY). For
a mapping between topological spaces, the term “measurable” will mean Borel
measurable unless specified otherwise. Moreover, suprema over the empty set
will have the value −∞ and infima over the empty set the value +∞.
2.2. The general problem and the optimal uncertainty quantification
(OUQ) framework
Let X be Polish and Φ be a measurable function mapping M(X ), the set of
measures of probability on X , onto the real line R, known as the quantity of
interest. Let µ† be an unknown or imperfectly known probability measure on X .
The general problem guiding our presentation will be that of estimating Φ(µ†).
Let A be an arbitrary subset of M(X ). If A represents all that is known
about µ† (in the sense that µ† ∈ A and that any µ ∈ A could, a priori, be µ†
given the available information) then [82] shows that the quantities
U(A) := sup
µ∈A
Φ(µ) (14)
L(A) := inf
µ∈A
Φ(µ) (15)
determine the inequality
L(A) ≤ Φ(µ†) ≤ U(A), (16)
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to be optimal given the available information µ† ∈ A as follows: It is simple to
see that the inequality (16) follows from the assumption that µ† ∈ A. Moreover,
for any ε > 0 there exists a µ ∈ A such that
U(A) − ε < Φ(µ) ≤ U(A).
Consequently since all that we know about µ† is that µ† ∈ A, it follows that
the upper bound Φ(µ†) ≤ U(A) is the best obtainable given that information,
and the lower bound is optimal in the same sense.
Although the OUQ optimization problems (14) and (15) are extremely large,
we have shown in [82], for the more general situation where A is a set of func-
tions f and measures µ and Φ a function of (f, µ), that an important subclass
enjoys significant and practical finite-dimensional reduction properties. First, by
[82, Cor. 4.4], although the optimization variables (f, µ) lie in a product space
of functions and probability measures, for OUQ problems governed by linear
inequality constraints on generalized moments, the search can be reduced to
one over probability measures that are products of finite convex combinations
of Dirac masses with explicit upper bounds on the number of Dirac masses.
Furthermore, in the special case that all constraints are generalized moments of
functions of f , the dependency on the coordinate positions of the Dirac masses
is eliminated by observing that the search over admissible functions reduces
to a search over functions on an m-fold product of finite discrete spaces, and
the search over m-fold products of finite convex combinations of Dirac masses
reduces to a search over the products of probability measures on this m-fold
product of finite discrete spaces [82, Thm. 4.7]. Finally, by [82, Thm. 4.9], using
the lattice structure of the space of functions, the search over these functions
can be reduced to a search over a finite set.
For the sake of clarity we will now restrict the presentations of our results to
the (simpler) situation where the quantity of interest Φ is (solely) a function of
an unknown measure µ. As in [82], the results of this paper can be generalized
to situations where Φ is a function of (f, µ).
Example 2.1. A classic example, when X = R is Φ(µ) := µ[X ≥ a] where
a is a safety margin. In the certification context one is interested in showing
that µ†[X ≥ a] ≤ ε, where ε is a safety certification threshold (i.e. the max-
imum acceptable µ†-probability of the system exceeding the safety margin a).
If U(A) ≤ ε, then the system associated with µ† is safe even in the worst case
scenario (given the information represented by A). If L(A) > ε, then the system
associated with µ† is unsafe even in the best case scenario (given the information
represented by A). If L(A) ≤ ε < U(A), then the safety of the system cannot
be decided (although we could declare the system to be unsafe due to lack of
information).
2.3. Bayesian priors on the admissible set
In the OUQ setting, an assumption of the form µ† ∈ A was used to derive
the optimal inequality (16). This paper will consider the situation in which
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one has priors on the admissible set A and also information in the form of
sample data. One of our goals is to analyse the robustness (or brittleness) of
Bayesian inference by obtaining optimal bounds on posterior values given local
misspecifications. In that context A can be viewed as a model class, and µ†,
as the realization of a probability measure (the prior) on A. In order to define
priors on the space of admissible scenarios, A needs to be given the structure
of a measurable space; i.e. a suitable σ-algebra ΣA on A must be provided.
From now on, we will assume A to be a Borel subset of the Polish spaceM(X ),
endowed with the Borel σ-algebra for A. We will also refer to a probability
measure π ∈ M(ΣA) as a prior.
Remark 2.2. The desire to have the Borel measurable structure of a Polish
space might seem to be a spurious level of abstraction, but there are many
good reasons for it. The first is that, by Suslin’s Theorem [63, Thm. 14.2], all
Borel subsets of a Polish space are Suslin, where a Suslin space is a continuous
Hausdorff image of a Polish space. Indeed, Suslin sets are important in mea-
surable selection theorems (see e.g. [29]) such as those that we use in the proof
of Lemma 3.10; furthermore, in addition to Ulam’s theorem [6, Thm. 4.3.8]
that all probability measures on a Polish space are regular (approximable from
within by compact sets), Schwartz’ theorem [87] implies that that all probability
measures on a Suslin space are regular, and, therefore, [95, Thm. 11.1] implies
that the extreme points in the space of probability measures on a Suslin space
are the Dirac measures. Consequently, when M(X ) is Polish, any Borel subset
A ⊆ M(X ) is Suslin and so the extreme points of probability measures on A
are the Dirac measures, and some powerful measurable selection theorems are
available. Moreover, when the base space is metrizable, then the space of prob-
ability measures is Polish in the weak topology if and only if the base space is
Polish.
Furthermore, since separability is equivalent to second countability for metric
spaces, we have that the Borel structure of a product is the product of Borel
structures of Polish spaces. In addition, by [40, Thm. 10.2.2], regular conditional
probabilities exist for observables with values in a Polish space. Also, Polish
spaces are the spaces of Descriptive Set Theory, see e.g. Kechris [63]. Polish
spaces appear to be the appropriate spaces to play topological games such as
the Banach–Mazur game [83], the Sierpin´ski game, the Ulam game, the Banach
game, and the Choquet game. Moreover, a theorem of Choquet [63, Thm. 8.18]
shows that a separable metric space is completely metrizable (and hence Polish)
if and only if the second player has a winning strategy in the strong Choquet
game. For a review of topological games, see Telga´rsky’s review [93], and for
topological games in hyperspace see that of Zsilinszky [108].
2.4. Data spaces and maps
In practice, the probability measure µ† is not observed directly; instead the
sample data arrives in the form of (realizations of) observation random variables,
the distribution of which is related to µ†. To simplify the current presentation,
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we will assume that this relation is determined by a function of µ† — such as the
case where the data X1, . . . , Xn are determined by n independent realizations
Xi of the random variable X determined by the possibly unknown distribution
µ†. Throughout this paper we will use the following notation: D will denote the
observable space (i.e. the space in which the sample data take values); D will be
assumed to be a metrizable Suslin space and D will denote a D-valued random
variable producing the observed sample data. To represent the dependence of
the observation random variable D on the unknown state µ† ∈ A we introduce
a measurable function
D : A →M(D),
where M(D) is given the Borel structure corresponding to the weak topology,
to define this relation. The idea is that D(µ) is the probability distribution of
the observed sample data D(µ) if µ† = µ, and for this reason it may be called
the data map or — even more loosely — the observation operator. Often, for
simplicity, we will write D instead of D(µ). Note that when the data comes in
the form of n i.i.d. realizations of µ† we have D = Xn and D(µ) = µn (where
µn is the n-fold tensorization of µ).
We proceed with a natural generalization of the Campbell measure and Palm
distribution associated with a random measure as described in [62] (see also [33,
Ch. 13] for a more current treatment). To that end, observe that since D is
metrizable, it follows from [4, Thm. 15.13], that, for any B ∈ B(D), the evalu-
ation ν 7→ ν(B), ν ∈ M(D), is measurable. Consequently, the measurability of
D implies that the mapping
D̂ : A× B(D)→ R
defined by
D̂(µ,B) := D(µ)[B], for µ ∈ A, B ∈ B(D)
is a transition function in the sense that, for fixed µ ∈ A, D̂(µ, · ) is a probability
measure, and, for fixed B ∈ B(D), D̂( · , B) is Borel measurable. Therefore, by
[22, Thm. 10.7.2], any π ∈M(A), defines a probability measure
π ⊙ D ∈M(B(A)× B(D))
through
π ⊙ D[A×B] := Eµ∼π[1A(µ)D(µ)[B]], for A ∈ B(A), B ∈ B(D), (17)
where 1A is the indicator function of the set A:
1A(µ) :=
{
1, if µ ∈ A,
0, if µ /∈ A.
It is easy to see that π is the A-marginal of π⊙D. Moreover, when X is Polish,
[4, Thm. 15.15] implies that M(X ) is Polish, and it follows that A ⊆M(X ) is
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second countable. Consequently, since D is Suslin and hence second countable,
it follows from [40, Prop. 4.1.7] that
B(A×D) = B(A)× B(D)
and hence π ⊙ D is a probability measure on A×D. That is,
π ⊙ D ∈ M(A×D).
Let us refer to an element of M(A) as a prior on A. With a prior π on
A, the quantity of interest Φ(µ) becomes a random variable and we will be
interested in estimating its distribution conditioned on the observation D ∈ B,
where B ∈ B(D).
Example 2.3. In the context of Example 2.1, we are interested in estimating
the probability (under the prior π) that the system is unsafe, conditioned on
the observations D ∈ B, i.e. the conditional expectation
(π ⊙ D)
[
µ[X ≥ a] > ǫ
∣∣∣D ∈ B].
If D corresponds to observing independent realizations of X , then the observa-
tion space D is Xn and the measure D(µ) is µn.
If D is the random variable that results from observing n independent real-
izations of (X + ξ) (X is observed with additive Gaussian noise ξ ∼ N (0, σ2)),
then the measure D(µ) is the one associated with the random variable D =
(X1 + ξ1, . . . , Xn + ξn)) where the X i are independent and distributed accord-
ing to µ and the ξi are independent Gaussian random variables of mean zero
and variance σ2.
2.5. Bayes’ theorem and conditional expectation
Henceforth A will be a Suslin space, and suppose now that we have π ⊙ D ∈
M(A × D) constructed in the above way. Let π · D denote the corresponding
Bayes’ sampling distribution defined by the D-marginal of π⊙D, and note that,
by (17), we have
π · D[B] := Eµ∼π
[
D(µ)[B]
]
, for B ∈ B(D). (18)
Since both D and A are Suslin it follows that the product A × D is Suslin.
Consequently, [22, Cor. 10.4.6] asserts that regular conditional probabilities exist
for any sub-σ-algebra of B(A × D). In particular, the product theorem of [22,
Thm. 10.4.11] asserts that product regular conditional probabilities(
π ⊙ D)|d ∈M(A), for d ∈ D
exist and that they are π · D-a.e. unique.
When we consider π ∈ M(A) a prior, then this result can be interpreted
as the posteriors of Bayes’ theorem. However, because such regular conditional
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probabilities are only uniquely defined π · D-a.e., when a data sample d ∈ D
arrives such that π · D[{d}] = 0, a posterior (π ⊙ D)|d that could be any of the
π · D-a.e.-equal regular conditional probabilities evaluated at d appears to have
dubious utility. Indeed, the fact that the regular conditional probabilities are
only uniquely defined π ·D-a.e. suggests that integrals of posteriors over subsets
B ∈ B(D) such that π · D[B] > 0 are the more natural objects. Moreover,
the restriction that B be an open set is natural for practical reasons, since
conditioning on D lying in an open subset B rather than on its exact value is
what one has to do when the sample data can only be observed after rounding
error. Furthermore, we will show in Section 4 that if the data d have been
sampled from a probability measure π† · D for some π† ∈ M(A) (commonly
called a “true prior” in Bayesian statistics) then with π† · D probability one
(on the realization of d), the π† · D-measure of any open set containing d is
strictly positive. In other words, π† · D-almost surely, π† (the “true prior”)
belongs to the random subset of M(A) defined as the priors π ∈ M(A) such
that π · D[B] > 0 for any open set B containing the data d (this subset is
randomized through the realization of the data d).
Finally, throughout, we will find it useful to assume that
Assumption 1. Φ is semibounded
in that it is either bounded above or bounded below. Semiboundedness is suffi-
cient to ensure that the integral of Φ with respect to any probability measure
exists, possibly with the value ∞ or −∞, and such integrands are sufficient for
the reduction theorems of Winkler [107] that we use.
Remark 2.4. Note that the assumption that Φ is semibounded is mostly for
convenience since integrands which are not semibounded, like that defining the
first moment, can be considered by restricting the space of measures to those
measures that have well-defined first moments.
2.6. Incompletely specified priors
In practical situations, (1) the choice of a particular prior on A involves a degree
of arbitrariness that may be incompatible with the certification of rare/critical
events, and (2) the definition of such a prior is a non-trivial task if A is in-
finite dimensional. For these reasons it is necessary to consider situations in
which the prior π is imperfectly known or specified. More precisely, the (lack
of) information (or specification) on π can be represented via the introduction
of a space Π where the subset Π ⊆ M(A) consists of the set of admissible
priors π.
One of our goals in allowing incompletely specified priors is to assess the
robustness of posterior Bayesian estimates with respect to the particular choice
of priors. More precisely we will compute optimal bounds on Eπ[Φ] when π ∈ Π
and show how these bounds are affected by the introduction of sample data by
computing optimal bounds on Eπ⊙D[Φ|B], for B ∈ B(D).
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3. Optimal bounds on the prior value
Recall that for a subset A and a measurable quantity of interest Φ: A → R, that
under the assumption µ† ∈ A, we have the optimal upper U(A) and lower L(A)
bounds on the value Φ(µ†) of the quantity of interest, defined in (14) and (15) by
U(A) := sup
µ∈A
Φ(µ)
L(A) := inf
µ∈A
Φ(µ).
When we put a prior π on A, we have to define the value Φ¯(π) of the prior π
corresponding to an extended quantity Φ¯ : M(A)→ R of interest corresponding
to Φ. Disregarding integrability concerns, for a given Φ, let us call the induced
function
Φ¯(π) := Eπ [Φ], π ∈M(A), (19)
the canonical one associated with Φ and abuse notation by denoting the function
Φ¯ as Φ. For such a canonical quantity of interest, we call the value Eπ[Φ] the
prior value, and note that the values
U(Π) := sup
π∈Π
Eπ
[
Φ
]
(20)
L(Π) := inf
π∈Π
Eπ
[
Φ
]
(21)
form a natural generalization of the values U(A) and L(A). Moreover, in the
same way that U(A) and L(A) are optimal upper and lower bounds on Φ(µ†)
given the information that (µ†) ∈ A, U(Π) and L(Π) are optimal upper and
lower bounds on Eπ[Φ] given the information that π ∈ Π. Of course, for these
expressions to be well defined, integrability concerns should be addressed. In-
deed, Assumption 1 implies that Eπ[Φ] is well defined for any bounded measure
π, possibly with the value ∞ or −∞, and therefore the quantities in (20) and
(21) are well defined.
Remark 3.1. The restriction that the the extended quantity of interest cor-
responding to Φ be canonical is really no restriction, but is assumed only to
simplify the presentation and notation. Indeed, there are many important ex-
tended quantities of interest that are not affine as functions of the measure π.
However, all the ones that we have thought of can be handled by small modifica-
tions of the present framework, and their inclusion here would simply complicate
the presentation and notation. Moreover, note that many affine non-canonical
extended quantities of interest become canonical through simple transforma-
tions. For example, when Φ1(µ) := µ[X ≥ a] is a quantity of interest, and
the extended quantity of interest is the probability that the system is unsafe,
i.e. π({µ | µ[X ≥ a] > ε}) where {µ | µ[X ≥ a] > ε} is the set of unsafe µ, then
this extended quantity of interest is not canonical with respect to Φ1. However,
by transformation to Φ2 := 1{r|r>ε} ◦ Φ1, the extended quantity of interest be-
comes canonical and U(Π) and L(Π), defined in terms of Φ2, are optimal upper
and lower bounds on the probability that the system is unsafe given the set of
priors Π.
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3.1. General information bounds on prior values
Let δ : A →M(A) be the mapping of points to unit Dirac measures, where δµ
denotes the Dirac mass at µ, and, for Π ⊆M(A), define
AΠ := δ−1Π = {µ ∈ A | δµ ∈ Π}. (22)
That is, AΠ consists of those scenarios µ that are not only admissible in the
sense that they lie in A, but are also admissible as a prior in the sense that δµ
is an element of Π.
With the convention that U(∅) := −∞ and L(∅) := +∞, the following
theorem shows the relationships among U(A) and U(AΠ) as defined by (14),
L(A) and L(AΠ) as defined by (15), and U(Π) and L(Π) as defined by (20)
and (21).
Theorem 3.2. It holds true that
U(AΠ) ≤ U(Π) ≤ U(A)
and
L(A) ≤ L(Π) ≤ L(AΠ).
Moreover, if AΠ is non-empty, then
L(A) ≤ L(Π) ≤ L(AΠ) ≤ U(AΠ) ≤ U(Π) ≤ U(A).
3.2. Priors specified by marginals
In many settings, probability measures or sets of probability measures are spec-
ified through generalized moments or other properties of marginal distributions.
To analyse this case, let Q be a topological space and consider a measurable map
Ψ: A → Q. Let us abuse notation by also denoting the corresponding pushfor-
ward of measures Ψ: M(A)→M(Q) by the same symbol Ψ. For a probability
measure Q ∈M(Q), let
Ψ−1Q := {π ∈M(A) | Ψπ = Q}
be the set of probability measures π ∈ M(A) that push forward to Q. More
generally, for a non-empty set Q ⊆M(Q), let
Ψ−1Q := {π ∈ M(A) | Ψπ ∈ Q} (23)
be the set of probability measures π ∈ M(A) such that Ψπ ∈ Q. Now, let Q ⊆
M(Q) be an admissible set of Ψ-marginals. Then the corresponding admissible
set of priors is Ψ−1Q ⊆ M(A) and the corresponding objects to be computed
are U(Ψ−1Q) and L(Ψ−1Q) according to (20) and (21).
We will now demonstrate how to reduce the computation of U(Ψ−1Q) and
L(Ψ−1Q) when Q is specified by linear inequalities. Later, in Section 3.2.2, we
will develop a more powerful nested reduction which will provide the foundation
for our reduction methods.
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Before we begin, we need to introduce some terminology. Following Winkler
[107], let Y be a topological space and let M⊆M(Y) be a convex set of mea-
sures. Let ext(M) denote the set of extreme points ofM and let the evaluation
field Σ(ext(M)) be the smallest σ-algebra of subsets of ext(M) such that the
evaluation map ν 7→ ν(B) is measurable for all B ∈ B(Y). Then a measure
ν ∈M(Y) is said to be a barycenter of M if there exists a probability measure
p on Σ(ext(M)) such that the barycentric formula
ν(B) =
∫
ext(M)
ν′(B) dp(ν′), B ∈ B(Y) (24)
holds. Furthermore, the following notion of a measure affine function is central
to Winkler’s [107] reduction theorems, which we use:
Definition 3.3. An extended real-valued function F onM⊆M(Y) is said to
be measure affine if, for all ν ∈ M and all probability measures p on Σ(ext(M))
for which the barycentric formula (24) holds, F is p-integrable and
F (ν) =
∫
ext(M)
F (ν′) dp(ν′).
A major consequence of Assumption 1, that Φ is semibounded, is that Eν [Φ]
exists, with possible values ∞ and −∞, for all finite measures ν. As a con-
sequence, by [107, Prop. 3.1], the extended-real-valued function ν 7→ Eν [Φ] is
measure affine.
3.2.1. Primary reduction for prior values
Let us consider the computation of
U(Ψ−1Q) = sup
π∈Ψ−1Q
Eπ[Φ] (25)
when Q is specified by n generalized moment inequalities determined by mea-
surable functions g1, . . . , gn. The situation for the lower bound L(Ψ−1Q) is the
same. That is, let I1, . . . , In be n closed intervals, allowing semi-infinite intervals
(−∞, qi] and [qi,∞), and define
Q = {Q ∈ M(Q) |EQ[gi] ∈ Ii for i = 1, . . . , n} ,
where implicit in the definition is that all n integrals exist. Then, by a change
of variables, EΨπ[gi] = Eπ[gi ◦ Ψ] holds if either integral exists (see e.g. [10,
Cor. 19.2]), so we conclude that
Ψ−1Q := {π ∈M(A) | Ψπ ∈ Q}
= {π ∈M(A) |EΨπ[gi] ∈ Ii for i = 1, , n}
= {π ∈M(A) |Eπ[gi ◦Ψ] ∈ Ii for i = 1, . . . , n} .
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Hence, Ψ−1Q is defined by the n generalized moment inequalities corresponding
to gi ◦Ψ: A → R for i = 1, . . . , n. Consequently, since the function π 7→ Eπ [Φ] is
measure affine, it follows from the reduction theorems of [82] that we can reduce
the supremum on the right-hand side of (25) to the convex combination of n+1
Dirac masses. To state the theorem we have just proven, let
∆(n) :=
{
n∑
i=0
αiδµi
∣∣∣∣∣µi ∈ A, αi ≥ 0, for i = 0, . . . , n
}
. (26)
be the set of non-negative combinations of n+1 Dirac masses. Let the vector I
of intervals have components Ii for i = 1, . . . , n, let
Π(I) := Ψ−1Q
be defined as above, and consider the subset
Π(I, n) := Π(I) ∩∆(n) ⊆ Π(I) (27)
of those measures which are the (n+1)-fold convex combinations of Dirac masses.
Theorem 3.4. Let A be Suslin, let Q be separable and metrizable, and let
Ψ: A → Q be measurable. Moreover, for n measurable functions g1, . . . , gn : Q →
R and n closed intervals I1, . . . , In, let
Q := {Q ∈M(Q) |EQ[gi] ∈ Ii for i = 1, . . . , n}
define the admissible set of Ψ-marginals. Then,
U(Π(I)) = U(Π(I, n))
where
U(Π(I, n)) =

sup
∑n
i=0 αiΦ(µi)
among µi ∈ A, αi ≥ 0,
∑n
i=0 αi = 1
such that
∑n
i=0 αigj
(
Ψ(µi)
) ∈ Ij for j = 1, . . . , n. (28)
Remark 3.5. The freedom to determine intervals Ii, i = 1, . . . , n, is one way
to incorporate uncertainty and maintain a reduction to n + 1 Dirac masses.
In particular, by choosing semi-infinite intervals Ii := (−∞, qi] we obtain a
reduction to n+1 Dirac masses for inequality constraints of the form EQ[gi] ≤ qi,
and by choosing point intervals Ii := [qi, qi] we obtain a reduction to n+1 Dirac
masses for equality constraints of the form EQ[gi] = qi. Moreover, by choosing
the interval to be semi-infinite or point interval depending on the index i we
obtain a reduction to n + 1 Dirac masses for mixed equality and inequality
constraints.
Theorem 3.4 can be put into a canonical form in the following way: by con-
sidering the modified feature map Ψ′ : A → Rn with components
Ψ′i := gi ◦Ψ, for i = 1, . . . , n,
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it follows from the above that
Ψ−1Q = {π ∈ M(A) |Eπ[Ψ′] ∈ I} .
That is, by changing from the feature map Ψ to Ψ′ we end up with a constraint
set defined by the first moment of the vector function Ψ′. Therefore, let us
remove the ′ from Ψ′, and require Ψ: A → Rn to be measurable. The following
theorem is the canonical form of Theorem 3.4. It is a corollary of Theorem 3.4
for the constraint Eπ[Ψ] ∈ Z when Z = I is a closed rectangle. However, it is
true for arbitrary Z ⊆ Rn.
Theorem 3.6. Let A be Suslin, let Ψ: A → Rn be measurable, let Z ⊂ Rn,
and let
Q := {Q ∈M(Rn) |EQ∼Q[Q] ∈ Z} (29)
be the set of those measures whose first moment belongs to Z. Then, for
Π(Z) := Ψ−1Q = {π ∈M(A) |Eπ[Ψ] ∈ Z} (30)
and Π(Z, n) := Π(Z) ∩∆(n), we have
U(Π(Z)) = U(Π(Z, n))
where
U(Π(Z, n)) =

sup
∑n
i=0 αiΦ(µi)
among µi ∈ A, αi ≥ 0,
∑n
i=0 αi = 1
such that
∑n
i=0 αiΨ(µi) ∈ Z.
(31)
Example 3.7. Let X := [0, 1], Q = R and consider the admissible set A :=
M([0, 1]), the quantity of interest Φ(µ) := µ[X ≥ a] for some a ∈ (0, 1), and the
map Ψ: A → R defined by Ψ(µ) := Eµ[X ]. Take as the set of admissible priors
π on A the collection
Π :=
{
π ∈ M(A) ∣∣Eµ∼π[Eµ[X ]] = q}
for some fixed q ∈ (0, a). Then we will show that
U(Π) = q/a. (32)
To that end, observe that since Eµ∼π[Eµ[X ]] = Eπ[Ψ], it follows that
Π = {π ∈M(A) |Eπ [Ψ] = q} ,
so that Theorem 3.6 implies that we can reduce the optimization in U(Π) to the
supremum over µ1, µ2 ∈ A, α ∈ [0, 1] of
αµ1[X ≥ a] + (1− α)µ2[X ≥ a]
subject to the constraint
αEµ1 [X ] + (1− α)Eµ2 [X ] = q.
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Introducing the slack variables q1 := Eµ1 [X ], q2 := Eµ2 [X ] and using [82,
Thm. 4.1] to reduce this problem further in µ1, µ2, we obtain that U(Π) is
equal to the supremum over α ∈ [0, 1] and q1, q2 ∈ [0, 1] of
αmin{1, q1
a
}+ (1− α)min{1, q2
a
}
subject to the constraint αq1 + (1 − α)q2 = q. Observing that the supremum
is achieved at q1, q2 ≤ a, we conclude that U(Π) = q/a, establishing (32).
Moreover, note that U(Π) = U(AΠ) for AΠ defined in (22) instead of the general
inequality U(AΠ) ≤ U(Π) of Theorem 3.2.
3.2.2. Nested reduction for prior values
The result of Example 3.7 can also be deduced through a nested reduction
that we will find generally more useful for two reasons. The first is that, in
practice, not only is it highly non-trivial to specify a prior on the space A, since
it requires quantifying information on an infinite-dimensional space, but it may
also be undesirable to do so. Indeed, if an expert does not have a prior on the full
space A but only on some projection Ψ(A) = Q, then, rather than arbitrarily
picking one particular prior on the space A compatible with the specified prior
on Ψ(A), it might be preferable to work with the set of priors on A specified
through such marginals. Our second and main motivation is that, even when we
can do the reduction on the primary space M(A), the reduced space remains
so large that it may not be amenable to computation. However with the nested
reduction theorems given below, the reduced space becomes computationally
manageable for finite-dimensional Q.
Example 3.8. Consider Φ(µ) := µ[X ≥ a], where a is thought of as a safety
margin, Ψ(µ) = (Eµ[X ],Varµ[X ]), Q = R2, and Q = {Q}, where Q corresponds
to the uniform distribution on [−1, 1]× [3, 4]. In that example, the expert has
only “the prior” that the mean of X with respect to µ is uniformly distributed
on [−1, 1] and that the variance of X with respect to µ is independent of its
mean and uniformly distributed on [3, 4]. Observe that in this situation Q does
not uniquely specify a prior π ∈M(A) but an infinite-dimensional set of priors
Ψ−1(Q) ⊆ M(A) and a robust approach would require assessing the safety of
the system under the whole set Ψ−1(Q) rather than under a particular element
π of that set.
Idea of the nested reduction Roughly, the idea of the nested reduction is
as follows. To compute (25), consider the induced function
U ◦Ψ−1 : Q → R
defined by (U ◦Ψ−1)(q) := U(Ψ−1(q)) = sup
µ∈Ψ−1(q)
Φ(µ), for q ∈ Q,
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where we use the notation of (14). From this it is natural to consider
EQ[U ◦Ψ−1], for Q ∈ Q.
Let Q ∈ Q. Then, for any π such that Ψπ = Q, it follows that
EQ[U ◦Ψ−1] = EΨπ[U ◦Ψ−1]
= Eπ[U ◦Ψ−1 ◦Ψ]
Unfortunately, it is not true that U ◦Ψ−1◦Ψ = Φ; instead it is (U ◦Ψ−1◦Ψ)(µ) =
supµ′:Ψ(µ′)=Ψ(µ) Φ(µ
′). However, if it were true, then we would obtain
EQ[U ◦Ψ−1] = EΨπ[U ◦Ψ−1]
= Eπ[U ◦Ψ−1 ◦Ψ]
= Eπ[Φ]
and conclude that
sup
Q∈Q
EQ[U ◦Ψ−1] = sup
π∈Ψ−1Q
Eπ [Φ] = U(Ψ−1Q).
We will show that, despite the fact that U ◦Ψ−1 ◦Ψ 6= Φ, the conclusion
U(Ψ−1Q) = sup
Q∈Q
EQ[U ◦Ψ−1] (33)
is still valid, provided that it is interpreted correctly. Heuristically, the reason
for this is that the supremum supπ∈Ψ−1Q in U(Ψ−1Q) is exploring the maximum
value of Φ on level sets of Ψ very much like the supremum in (U ◦ Ψ−1)(q) =
supΨ−1(q) Φ.
If A is such that a reduction theorem, e.g. from [82], applies to reduce the
computation of the inner supremum in U ◦ Ψ−1 to the supremum over convex
combinations of Dirac masses, and the admissible set Q is such that a reduction
theorem applies to the computation of the outer supremum of supQ∈Q EQ[U ◦
Ψ−1], then the identity (33) represents a nesting of reductions.
Let us now establish a result like (33). To do so will require addressing three
questions: (1) What kind of function is U ◦ Ψ−1? (2) What kind of measures
Q ∈ M(Q) can define an integral of a function with properties discovered from
the answer to (1)? (3) Can we obtain a measurable solution operator to the
optimization problem (U ◦Ψ−1)(q), where q ∈ Q? To that end, let us first recall
a definition of universally measurable functions.
Definition 3.9. Let (T, T ) be a measurable space, and for a positive mea-
sure ν on (T, T ), let Tν denote the ν-completion of T . Let T̂ :=
⋂
ν Tν , where
the intersection is over all positive bounded measures ν, denote the universally
measurable sets. A T̂ -measurable function is said to be universally measurable.
At the heart of the commutative representation used for the nested reduction
is the following optimal measurable selection lemma answering questions (1) and
(3) above:
26 H. Owhadi et al.
Lemma 3.10. Let A be a Suslin space, let Q be a separable and metrizable
space, and let Ψ: A → Q be measurable. Then, for any subset T ⊆ Ψ(A),
1. U ◦Ψ−1 is B̂(T )-measurable
2. for all δ > 0, there exists a δ-suboptimal B̂(T )-measurable section of Ψ;
that is, a B̂(T )-measurable function ψ : T → A such that Ψ(ψ(q)) = q for
all q ∈ T and
Φ
(
ψ(q)
)
> U(Ψ−1(q))− δ, for all q ∈ T.
To answer question (2) above, define a support supp(Q) of a measure Q ∈
M(Q), as in [4, Ch. 12.3], to be a closed set such that
• Q(Q \ supp(Q)) = 0, and
• if G ⊆ Q is open and G ∩ supp(Q) 6= ∅, then Q(G ∩ supp(Q)) > 0.
When Q is a separable and metrizable space, it follows that it is second count-
able and therefore, by [4, Thm. 12.14], all Q ∈ M(Q) have a uniquely defined
support. Now consider a measure Q ∈M(Q) such that supp(Q) ⊆ Ψ(A). Then,
by Lemma 3.10, U◦Ψ−1 is B̂(supp Q)-measurable. Therefore, the expected value
EQ[U ◦Ψ−1] can be defined by integration with respect to the completion Q̂:
EQ[U ◦Ψ−1] := EQ̂[U ◦Ψ−1]. (34)
More generally, for any universally measurable function f and any finite measure
Q, we define the expected value EQ[f ] of f by
EQ[f ] := EQ̂[f ]. (35)
Such a method of defining integrals of, possibly non-Borel measurable, but uni-
versally measurable, functions brings up many questions such as: when is it
uniquely defined?; for a fixed integrand, when is the expectation operation affine
in the measure?; does it have a change a variables formula? All such questions
have nice answers and, although we are sure that this is classical, we cannot
find a reference for these facts so we have included statements and proofs of the
facts needed in this paper in Appendix A.1.
We now state our nested reduction theorem of the form (33):
Theorem 3.11. Let A be a Suslin space, let Q be a separable and metrizable
space, and let Ψ: A → Q measurable. Moreover, let Q ⊆ M(Q) be such that
supp(Q) ⊆ Ψ(A) for all Q ∈ Q. Then, for each Q ∈ Q, Ψ−1Q is non-empty.
Moreover, the upper bound U(Ψ−1Q), defined in (20), satisfies
U(Ψ−1Q) = sup
Q∈Q
EQ
[U ◦Ψ−1]. (36)
where the expectations on the right-hand side are defined as in (34). Finally, the
expectation operator on the right-hand side is measure affine in Q.
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Remark 3.12. Note that (36) can be written
sup
π∈Ψ−1Q
Eµ∼π
[
Φ(µ)
]
= sup
Q∈Q
[
Eq∼Q
[
sup
µ∈Ψ−1(q)
Φ(µ)
]]
. (37)
Remark 3.13. Since the right-hand side is measure affine in Q, if Q is speci-
fied through (multi-)linear generalized moment inequalities, then the reduction
theorems of [82] can be applied to obtain the supremum over Q by reducing Q
to a convex combination of a finite number of Dirac masses on Q. Moreover, if
Q consists of a single element, i.e. Q = {Q}, then
U(Ψ−1Q) = U(Ψ−1Q) = EQ
[U ◦Ψ−1], (38)
and the right hand-side of (38) can be approximately evaluated via Monte Carlo
sampling of q ∈ Q according to the measure Q.
Remark 3.14. A similar theorem can obtained for the optimal lower bound
L(Ψ−1Q). Throughout this paper, results given for optimal upper bounds U
can be translated into results for optimal lower bounds L by considering the
negative quantity of interest −Φ and for the sake of concision we will not write
those results unless necessary.
Example 3.15. Consider again Example 3.7, where X := [0, 1], Q = R, the
admissible set A := M([0, 1]), the quantity of interest Φ(µ) := µ[X ≥ a] for
some a ∈ (0, 1), the map Ψ: A → R is defined by Ψ(µ) := Eµ[X ], and the set
of admissible priors π on A is the collection
Π := {π ∈M(A) |Eµ∼π [Eµ[X ]] = q} .
for some fixed q ∈ (0, a). We will now demonstrate how the result U(Π) = q/a
of (32) obtained by the primary reduction follows from the nested reduction
theorem. To that end, observe that since Ψ(A) = [0, 1] ⊆ R, by restricting to
measures Q ∈M(R) with support supp(Q) ⊆ [0, 1], Theorem 3.11 implies that
U(Π) = sup
Q∈Q
Eq′∼Q
[
sup
µ∈M([0,1]) :Eµ[X]=q′
µ[X ≥ a]
]
, (39)
where Q is the set of probability measures Q on R with support contained in
[0, 1] such that EQ[Q] = q. Theorem 4.1 of [82] shows that the inner supremum
of µ[X ≥ a] can be achieved by assuming that µ is the weighted sum of two
Dirac masses, i.e.
sup
µ∈M([0,1])
Eµ[X]=q
′
µ[X ≥ a] = sup
α,x1,x2∈[0,1]
αx1+(1−α)x2=q′
(αδx1 + (1− α)δx2)[X ≥ a]. (40)
For q′ > a, the supremum in the right-hand side of (40) is 1, and for q′ ≤ a,
the supremum in the right-hand side of (40) is achieved by x2 = 0, x1 = a and
α = q′/a, and so we conclude that
sup
µ∈M([0,1])
Eµ[X]=q
′
µ[X ≥ a] = min{1, q′
a
}.
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Hence, by identifying the measures Q ∈ M(R) with support supp(Q) ⊆ [0, 1]
with M([0, 1]) in the obvious way, (39) becomes
U(Π) = sup
Q∈M([0,1])
EQ[Q]=q
Eq′∼Q
[
min{1, q′
a
}
]
. (41)
Using [82, Thm. 4.1] again, we obtain that the supremum in Q in the right-hand
side of (41) is equal to the supremum over α, q1, q2 ∈ [0, 1], of
αmin{1, q1
a
}+ (1− α)min{1, q2
a
} (42)
subject to the constraint that αq1 + (1 − α)q2 = q. This supremum is achieved
by q1 = a, q2 = 0 and α =
q
a
, and so we obtain that U(Π) = q/a, in agreement
with (32).
4. Optimal bounds on the posterior value
What happens to the optimal bounds (20) and (21) on the prior value Eπ[Φ],
investigated in Section 3, after conditioning on the data? Does the interval
corresponding to these optimal bounds shrink down to a single point as more
and more data comes in? Does this interval shrink as the measurement noise
on the data is reduced? What happens to posterior estimates associated with
two distinct but close priors, possibly sharing the same marginal distribution
on a high dimensional space? These are the questions that will be investigated
in this section. Our answers will show that: (1) optimal bounds on posterior
estimates grow as data comes in; (2) optimal bounds on posterior estimates
grow as measurement noise is reduced (3) two priors sharing the same high-
dimensional marginals can lead to diametrically opposed posterior estimates.
In some sense these results can be seen as extreme occurrences of the dilation
property observed in robust Bayesian inference [103].
As discussed in Section 2.4, let us now consider the case where the probability
distribution of the data is a known function D(µ) of the admissible candidates
µ ∈ A. As shown in Section 2, directly conditioning measures π⊙D with respect
to the random variable D representing the observed sample data would require
manipulating regular conditional probabilities on A×D.
Furthermore, in Bayesian statistics a prior π may represent a “subjective
belief” about reality and, in such situations, the data may be sampled from
π† · D† which may be distinct from π · D. In frequentist analyses of Bayesian
statistics π† is called the “true” prior, or “data-generating distribution”, and π
a “subjective” prior (see [14] and references therein). Although it is known that
the subjective prior π might be distinct from the true prior π†, one may still try
to evaluate the conditional expectation of the quantity of interest Φ using π as
the distribution on A. We will show here that although the observation of the
sample data d does not uniquely determine the true prior π†, it does determine
a random subset of M(A) (i.e. a random subset of priors) denoted R(d) such
that, π†-a.s., π† ∈ R(d). This observation is based on the following fundamental
lemma:
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Lemma 4.1. For a strongly Lindelo¨f space Y and a Borel measure ν on B(Y),
define
E :=
{
y ∈ Y
∣∣∣∣ there is an open neighborhood Oyof y such that ν(Oy) = 0
}
.
Then ν(E) = 0.
Remark 4.2. Recall that a Lindelo¨f space is a topological space such that any
open cover has a countable subcover and a strongly Lindelo¨f space is such that
any open subset is Lindelo¨f. Since D is assumed to be Suslin from Section 2.4,
and Suslin implies strongly Lindelo¨f, Lemma 4.1 shows that any open neighbor-
hood Bd of any observed value d ∈ D has nonzero measure with probability 1.
Remark 4.3. Any separable Hilbert space, in particular the Euclidian space Rk,
is strongly Lindelo¨f. In this situation, Lemma 4.1 implies that if for any observa-
tion y generated by a law ν ∈ M(Y) we place an open ball Br(y)(y) of non-zero
radius r(y) > 0 about y, then with ν-probability 1 we have ν(Br(y)(y)) > 0.
That is,
ν
({y ∈ Y | ν(Br(y)(y)) > 0}) = 1.
Now suppose the data d are generated according to a probability measure
π† · D (where π† is the “true” prior). We conclude from Lemma 4.1 that when
we observe a sample d, if we assume that π† ∈ R(d) where
R(d) := {π ∈M(A) ∣∣ π · D[B] > 0 for all B open containing d} ,
then we will be correct in this assumption with π† · D-probability 1. Therefore,
when the data d are generated and we observe that d ∈ Bd where Bd is an open
subset containing the data d (to keep our notation simple, we will, later on,
drop d in the notation Bd), then we restrict our attention to priors π ∈ Π such
that π · D[Bd] > 0. That is to say, we restrict our attention to the intersection
of Π with the set of priors π such that π ∈ M(A) and π · D[Bd] > 0. We write
ΠBd for this intersection, i.e.
ΠBd := {π ∈ Π |π · D[Bd] > 0} .
If ΠBd is void, then we assert that “π
† is not contained in Π” and we know that
this assertion is true with π† · D-probability 1 on the realization of the data d.
Conversely, if π† is contained in Π, then ΠBd must, with π
† · D-probability 1
on the realization of the data d, still contain π† (in particular it must be non-
empty).
Happily, this approach also facilitates the efficient computation of the con-
ditional expectations because now they have a simple representation. Indeed,
consider the conditional expectation of an object of interest Φ given a prior π
and data map D, conditioned on a subset B ∈ B(D) such that π · D[B] > 0. It
follows from (17) and (18) that the conditional expectation of Φ given B is
Eπ⊙D
[
Φ
∣∣B] := E(µ,d)∼π⊙D[Φ(µ)1B(d)]
π · D[B] ,
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which, using (17) and (18), leads to
Eπ⊙D
[
Φ
∣∣B] = Eµ∼π[Φ(µ)D(µ)[B]]
Eµ∼π
[
D(µ)[B]
] . (43)
Moreover, recall that this conditional expectation is the best mean squared
approximation of Φ under the measure π⊙D, given the information that D ∈ B,
i.e.
Eπ⊙D
[
Φ
∣∣B] = argmin
m∈R
Eπ⊙D
[(
Φ−m)2∣∣∣B]. (44)
Consequently, for any open subset B ⊆ D, we define
ΠB := {π ∈ Π | (π · D)[B] > 0} . (45)
where, by (18),
π · D[B] := Eµ∼π
[
D(µ)[B]
]
. (46)
Then, since (π ·D)[B] > 0, the formula (43) for conditional expectation implies
that
U(Π|B) := sup
π∈ΠB
Eπ⊙D
[
Φ
∣∣B] (47)
L(Π|B) := inf
π∈ΠB
Eπ⊙D
[
Φ
∣∣B] (48)
where
Eπ⊙D
[
Φ
∣∣B] = Eµ∼π[Φ(µ)D(µ)[B]]
Eµ∼π
[
D(µ)[B]
] . (49)
Finally, if B is an open neighborhood containing the sample data d, then it
follows that U(Π|B) and L(Π|B) are optimal upper and lower bounds on the
posterior values Eπ⊙D[Φ|B], given the observation D ∈ B, over all π ∈ Π such
that π · D[B] > 0.
Example 4.4. When Φ is the indicator function of the set {µ | µ[X ≥ a] > ǫ}
(i.e. the set of unsafe µ), U(Π|B) and L(Π|B) are optimal upper and lower
bounds on the “posterior probability” that the system is unsafe given the ob-
servation D ∈ B (and the set Π of priors and observation maps respectively).
4.1. General information bounds on posterior values
Now let B ⊆ D be open and let
AΠB := {µ ∈ A | δµ ∈ Π and D(µ)[B] > 0} , (50)
U(AΠB ) := sup
µ∈AΠB
Φ(µ),
and use L for the corresponding infimum. The following theorem is a straight-
forward consequence of (43):
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Theorem 4.5. It holds true that
U(AΠB ) ≤ U(ΠB) ≤ U(A),
and
L(A) ≤ L(ΠB) ≤ L(AΠB ).
Moreover, if AΠB is non empty, then
L(A) ≤ L(ΠB) ≤ L(AΠB ) ≤ U(AΠB ) ≤ U(ΠB) ≤ U(A).
Remark 4.6. The dependence of U(AΠB ) and L(AΠB ) on the sample data
is very weak. In particular, if D corresponds to observing i.i.d. realizations of
(X + ξ, f †(X) + ξ′) where ξ and ξ′ are centered Gaussian random variables
of arbitrarily small (non zero) variance, then it can be shown that U(AΠB ) =
U(AΠ) and L(AΠB ) = L(AΠ). In that situation, if L(AΠ) < U(AΠ), then
U(AΠB )−L(AΠB ) remains bounded away from 0 by a strictly positive constant
that is independent of D and B, which, in particular, implies that the range of
achievable posterior values cannot shrink towards Φ(µ†) regardless of the num-
ber of observed i.i.d. samples. The presence of such information bounds suggests
that the consistency of Bayesian estimators cannot be established independently
of (uniformly in) the choice of priors (this point will also be substantiated by
Theorem 4.13).
4.2. Primary reduction for posterior values
As in Section 3.2.1, when priors are specified through finite-dimensional inequal-
ities, it is possible to provide a reduction of the computation of U(Π|B) on the
primary space. To that end, letM+(A) denote the set of positive bounded mea-
sures on A and let us extend the “expectation notation” to mean integration
with respect to a positive measure in the natural way: for a measurable function
ψ and a π+ ∈ M+(A) define
Eπ+ [ψ] :=
∫
A
ψ dπ+
if the integral exists.
Let ψ0, . . . , ψn be real-valued measurable functions on A and define
Π+ :=
{
π+ ∈M+(A)
∣∣Eπ+ [ψ0] = 1, and Eπ+ [ψi] = 0 for i = 1, . . . , n} ,
where implicit in the definition is that all n+ 1 integrals exist, and let
Π+,n := Π+ ∩∆(n)
be the set of those measures in Π+ that are non-negative sums of n + 1 Dirac
masses. The following theorem is a generalization of [82, Thm. 4.1] to positive
measures (see also [107, Thm. 3.2] from which the proof of [82, Thm. 4.1] was
derived).
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Theorem 4.7. If A is a Suslin space, then
sup
π+∈Π+
Eπ+ [Φ] = sup
π+∈Π+,n+1
Eπ+ [Φ]. (51)
Furthermore, if ψ0 is non-negative on A and there exists a measurable function
ϕ such that Φ = ψ0ϕ, then
sup
π+∈Π+
Eπ+ [Φ] = sup
π+∈Π+,n
Eπ+ [Φ]. (52)
Theorem 4.7 can be used to produce a primary reduction of U(Π⊙BD) when
Π is defined by a finite number of equalities. To state the theorem, recall that,
for arbitrary Π and B, the definition
ΠB := {π ∈ Π |π · D[B] > 0}
of (45), where by (46)
π · D[B] := Eµ∼π
[
D(µ)[B]
]
;
recall also the notation of (47)
U(Π|B) := sup
π∈ΠB
Eπ⊙D
[
Φ
∣∣B];
and recall the result (43) that, for any π ∈ ΠB ,
Eπ⊙D
[
Φ
∣∣B] = Eµ∼π[Φ(µ)D(µ)[B]]
Eµ∼π
[
D(µ)[B]
] .
The proof of the following theorem is obtained by first proving the theorem for
equality constraints Z = {q}, by observing that U(Π(q)|B) is a linear fractional
optimization problem in π and utilizing the fact that such problems are equiv-
alent to linear problems [27], and then applying Theorem 4.7. To extend the
result to the subset Z ⊆ Rn, one uses a layercake approach as in the proof of
Theorem 3.6. As in Section 3, the following primary reduction theorem, Theo-
rem 4.8, will be formulated in canonical form and the nested reduction theorem,
Theorem 4.11, will be in the general form.
Theorem 4.8. Let A be Suslin and let Ψ: A → Rn be measurable. For Z ⊆
Rn, let Π(Z) := {π ∈ M(A) | Eπ [Ψ] ∈ Z}. Then U(Π(Z)|B) is equal to the
supremum over αi ≥ 0, q ∈ Z and µi ∈ A of
n∑
i=0
αiΦ(µi)D(µi)[B]
subject to the constraints
n∑
i=0
αi
(
Ψ(µi)− q
)
= 0
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and
n∑
i=0
αiD(µi)[B] = 1. (53)
Example 4.9. Consider again Example 3.7 with the admissible set A :=
M([0, 1]), the quantity of interest Φ(µ) := µ[X ≥ a], the map Ψ(µ) := Eµ[X ]
and the set of admissible priors
Π :=
{
π ∈M(A) ∣∣Eµ∼π[Eµ[X ]] = q} .
for some q ∈ (0, a). We saw in Example 3.7 that U(Π) = q
a
. Now suppose that
we observe the random variable D := (X1, . . . , Xn) corresponding to n i.i.d.
samples of µ† ∈ A. More precisely, we observe D ∈ B where B = B1 × · · ·Bn
and Bi is the ball in (0, 1) of center xi and radius ρ, xi ∈ (0, 1) and 0 < ρ≪ 1/n.
Let Dn denote the data map corresponding to taking n i.i.d. samples, that is,
Dn(µ) := µ⊗ · · · ⊗ µ, and observe that Dn(µ)[B] =∏ni=1 µ[Bi].
Theorem 4.8 implies that U(Π⊙BDn) is equal to the supremum over α1, α2 ≥
0, µ1, µ2 ∈ A of
α1µ1[X ≥ a]Dn(µ1)[B] + α2µ2[X ≥ a]Dn(µ2)[B]
subject to the constraints
α1(Eµ1 [X ]− q) + α2(Eµ2 [X ]− q) = 0,
α1D
n(µ1)[B] + α2D
n(µ2)[B] = 1,
with Dn(µ)[B] =
∏n
i=1 µ(Bi). Introducing slack variables β1,i := µ1[Bi] and
β2,i := µ2[Bi] as n linear constraints on µ1 and n linear constraints on µ2 we
obtain (from [82, Thm. 4.1]) that the supremum can be achieved by assuming
that each µi is the weighted sum of at most n+2 Dirac masses. Assuming that
the Bi are non intersecting balls of radius ρ ≪ 1/n centered on x1, . . . , xn, n
of these Dirac masses will have to be put at x1, . . . , xn; for optimality, the two
others will have to be put at 0 and a (with weights p1 and p2). Introducing
γ1 = α1D
n(µ1)[B] and γ2 = α2D
n(µ2)[B], it follows that U(Π ⊙B Dn) is equal
(as ρ ↓ 0) to the supremum over γ1, γ2 ≥ 0, p1, p2 ∈ [0, 1] of
γ1p1 + γ2p2
subject to the constraints
γ1 + γ2 = 1,
and
γ1
(ap1 +
∑n
i=1 xiβ1,i)− q∏n
i=1 β1,i
+ γ2
(ap2 +
∑n
i=1 xiβ2,i)− q∏n
i=1 β2,i
= 0.
By considering 0 < βi,j ≪ 1 it is easy to obtain that U(Π⊙B Dn) = 1.
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Example 4.10. We will now use Theorem 4.8 to prove equation (8) of Sub-
section 1.4. Let Φ be defined as in Subsection 1.4. Let A(α) and Π(α) be de-
fined as in (6) and (7). Then, Theorem 4.8 implies that U(Π(α)|Bnδ ), the least
upper bound on posterior values, is equal to the supremum over α1, α2 ≥ 0,
µ1, µ2 ∈ A(α) of
α1µ1[X ≥ a]µn1 [Bnδ ] + α2µ2[X ≥ a]µn2 [Bnδ ]
subject to the constraints{
α1(Eµ1 [X ]−m) + α2(Eµ2 [X ]−m) = 0,
α1µ
n
1 [B
n
δ ] + α2µ
n
2 [B
n
δ ] = 1,
where we have used the notation µn[Bnδ ] :=
∏n
i=1 µ(Bδ(xi)).
Introducing γ1 = α1µ
n
1 [B
n
δ ] and γ2 = α2µ
n
2 [B
n
δ ], it follows that U(Π(α)|Bnδ )
is equal to the supremum over γ1, γ2 ≥ 0, µ1, µ2 ∈ A(α) of
γ1µ1[X ≥ a] + γ2µ2[X ≥ a]
subject to the constraints{
γ1 + γ2 = 1,
γ1
Eµ1 [X]−m
µn1 [B
n
δ
] + γ2
Eµ2 [X]−m
µn2 [B
n
δ
] = 0.
which can be simplified to the supremum over µ1, µ2 ∈ A(α) of
1
1 +
Eµ1 [X]−m
m−Eµ2 [X]
µn2 [B
n
δ
]
µn1 [B
n
δ
]
µ1[X ≥ a] + (1− 1
1 +
Eµ1 [X]−m
m−Eµ2 [X]
µn2 [B
n
δ
]
µn1 [B
n
δ
]
)µ2[X ≥ a] (54)
By introducing slack variables for m1 = Eµ1 [X ] and m2 = Eµ2 [X ], maximizing
(54) with m1 and m2, then taking a supremum over m1,m2, one obtains that
the supremum of (54) is achieved, in the limit δ ↓ 0, in the configuration where
µ1 puts most of its mass on a, µ2 puts most of its mass on 0, and
µn2 [B
n
δ ]
µn1 [B
n
δ
] ≈ 1α2
which yields
lim
δ→0
U(Π(α)|Bnδ ) = 11 + 1
α2
a−m
m
. (55)
4.3. Nested reduction for posterior values
Here, as in Section 3.2, we show how the optimization problems (47) and (48)
can be reduced to nested OUQ optimization problems (i.e. nested problems
analogous to (14) and (15)) when the collection Π of admissible priors is defined
by how they push forward by a measurable mapping Ψ: A → Q. That is, we
specify a feature space Q, a measurable map Ψ: A → Q, a subset Q ⊆ M(Q)
and define the admissible set of priors by
Π := Ψ−1Q = {π ∈ M(A) | Ψπ ∈ Q}.
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As before, we focus on reducing the upper bound
U(Ψ−1Q∣∣B) := sup
π∈(Ψ−1Q)B
Eπ⊙D[Φ|B]. (56)
Theorem 4.11. Let A be a Suslin space, let Q be a separable and metrizable
space, and let Ψ: A → Q be measurable. Moreover, let Q ⊆M(Q) be such that
supp(Q) ⊆ Ψ(A) for all Q ∈ Q. Then, for each Q ∈ Q, Ψ−1Q is non-empty.
Moreover, the upper bound U(Ψ−1Q|B), defined in (56), satisfies
U(Ψ−1Q∣∣B) = sup{λ ∈ R ∣∣∣∣∣ supQ∈QEq∼Q
[
sup
µ∈Ψ−1(q)
(
Φ(µ)− λ)D(µ)[B]] > 0} ,
(57)
where the expectations on the right-hand side are defined as in (35). Finally, the
expectation operator on the right-hand side is measure affine in Q, as defined
in (3.3).
Remark 4.12. Note that Theorem 4.11 is more general than Theorem 4.8
because its application does not require the assumption that Ψ−1Q is defined
via generalized moments constraints.
The following theorem is our main result. It shows not only that the right-
hand side of the assertion (57) of Theorem 4.11 depends on the sample data in
a very weak way, but also that, under very mild assumptions, the observation
of this sample data leads to an increase (rather than a decrease) of the least
upper bound on the quantity of interest:
Theorem 4.13 (Main Brittleness Theorem). Let A be a Suslin space, let Q be
a separable and metrizable space, and let Ψ: A → Q be measurable. Moreover,
let Q ⊆ M(Q) be such that supp(Q) ⊆ Ψ(A) for all Q ∈ Q. Suppose that, for
all δ > 0, there exists some Q ∈ Q such that
Eq∼Q
[
inf
µ∈Ψ−1(q)
D(µ)[B]
]
= 0 (58)
and
Pq∼Q
[
sup
µ∈Ψ−1(q),D(µ)[B]>0
Φ(µ) > sup
µ∈A
Φ(µ)− δ
]
> 0. (59)
Then
U(Ψ−1Q∣∣B) = U(A). (60)
Remark 4.14. Note that the convention that sup∅ = −∞ implies that, if the
assumption (59) is satisfied, then there is a measure Q ∈ Q such that the set of
q such that D(µ)[B] > 0 for some µ ∈ Ψ−1(q) has strictly positive Q-measure.
Remark 4.15. Theorem 4.13 states that if there exists Q ∈ Q putting some
mass on a neighborhood of the values q of Ψ where supµ∈Ψ−1(q) Φ(µ) achieves
its supremum, then
U(Ψ−1(Q)∣∣B) = U(A).
36 H. Owhadi et al.
On the other hand, Theorem 3.2 asserts that
U(Ψ−1Q) ≤ U(A), (61)
so we conclude that
U(Ψ−1Q) ≤ U(Ψ−1Q∣∣B). (62)
That is, observing the sample data does not improve the optimal bound! More-
over, when the inequality (61) is strict, if we define
δ := U(A)− U(Ψ−1Q) > 0
then it follows that
U(Ψ−1Q) + δ ≤ U(Ψ−1(Q)∣∣B), (63)
from which we conclude that when the inequality (61) is strict, observing the
sample data makes the optimal bound worse! In other words, after the observa-
tion of the sample data (which may be limited to a single realization of X under
the measure µ†, or an arbitrary large number of independent samples of Xi) the
optimal upper bound on the quantity of interest,
U(Ψ−1Q) = sup
π∈Ψ−1Q
Eµ∼π
[
Φ(µ)
]
,
increases to
U(A) = sup
µ∈A
Φ(µ).
Example 4.16. Consider A :=M([0, 1]), Φ(µ) = Eµ[X ], Dn(µ) := µ⊗ · · · ⊗µ.
In this example are interested in estimating the mean of X under some unknown
measure µ† ∈ A and we observe d = (d1, . . . , dn), n i.i.d. samples from X ; note
that n can be very large. The sample data contain information on µ† through the
fact that their distribution is Dn(µ†) = µ†⊗· · ·⊗µ† (i.e. although the distribution
of the sample data is unknown, its dependency structure, as a functional of µ†,
is known).
Let k be a (possibly large) number. Define Π to be the set of priors π under
which the distribution of (Eµ[X ], . . . ,Eµ[X
k]) is Q, where Q is a distribution
on Rk such that Eµ[X ] (its first marginal) is uniformly distributed on [0, 1] and
such that the (conditional) distribution of Eµ[X
2] conditioned on Eµ[X ] = q1 is
the uniform distribution on the interval[
inf
µ∈A,E[X]=q1
Eµ[X
2], sup
µ∈A,E[X]=q1
Eµ[X
2]
]
and such that the conditional distributions of the other marginals Eµ[X
k] are
defined iteratively in the same manner. For this example, note that Ψ(µ) =
(Eµ[X ], . . . ,Eµ[X
k]). Note that, for q := (q1, . . . , q
k) in the range of Ψ (i.e. Ψ(A)),
Ψ−1(q) is the subset of measures µ ∈ M([0, 1]) such that Eµ[X i] = qi for
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1 ≤ i ≤ k. Let B be defined as B1 × · · ·Bn where each Bi is a ball of radius ρ
containing di.
We will now use Theorem 4.13 to compute optimal bounds on the posterior
values of Φ(µ) = Eµ[X ]. We will focus our attention on the upper bound. First
observe that in this example Q is reduced to the single measure Q constructed
above and D is reduced to the single data map Dn.
Let us first check that condition (59) is always satisfied (irrespective of the
value of the data d). Note that condition (59) is satisfied if for all δ > 0 there
exists a subset of values of q of strictly positive Q-measure such that {µ ∈
Ψ−1(q) | Dn(µ)[B] > 0 and Eµ[X ] ≥ 1 − δ} is non empty. So, let δ > 0 be
arbitrary and define µd to be the empirical distribution of d, i.e.
µd :=
∑n
i=1 δdi
n
.
Define
Aδ := {µ ∈ A | Eµ[X ] ≥ 1− δ/2}.
One can show by induction that Ψ(Aδ) has a non-empty interior and that any
open subset of Ψ(A) has strictly positive Q-measure. Let q∗ be a point in the
interior of Ψ(Aδ), and let Bτ (q∗) be a ball of center q∗ and radius τ such that
B2τ (q
∗) is contained in the interior of Ψ(Aδ). Note that Bτ (q∗) has strictly
positive Q-measure. Furthermore, for ǫ sufficiently small, for each q ∈ Bτ (q∗)
there exists q′ ∈ B2τ (q∗) and µ ∈ Ψ−1(q′) such that µǫ := (1 − ǫ)µ + ǫµd ∈
Ψ−1(q). Since Dn(µǫ)[B] > 0 and Eµ[X ] ≥ 1 − δ/2, it follows that (59) is
satisfied (irrespective of the value of the data d).
Let us now consider condition (58). Observe that condition (58) is satisfied
if for Q-almost all q ∈ Ψ(A) and all ǫ > 0, there exists µ ∈ Ψ−1(q) such that
Dn(µ)[B] < ǫ. Assume that d contains at least k+2 distinct points and that ρ is
strictly smaller than half of the minimal distance between two of such points, so
that the associated Bi do not overlap; note that this assumption is satisfied with
probability converging to one (as n→∞) if the data are sampled from a measure
µ† that is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure on [0, 1].
Let q ∈ Ψ(A); by the reduction theorems of [82] there exists µq ∈ Ψ−1(q) such
that µq is the weighted sum of at most k + 1 Dirac masses in [0, 1]. Since there
exist at least k + 2 non-overlapping Bi we have D
n(µq)[B] = 0 which implies
condition (58). Hence, Theorem 4.13 implies that, for this (possibly) highly
constrained problem characterized by a (possibly) large number of sampled data
points, the optimal bounds on the posterior values of Eµ[X ] are zero and one
whereas the set of prior values of Eµ[X ] is the single point { 12}.
Remark 4.17. For a thorough analysis of Example 4.16 we refer to [80] where,
in particular, a quantitative version of Theorem 4.13 is developed and then
applied to Example 4.16. Curiously, a refined analysis of the integral geometry
of the truncated Hausdorff moment space, used to demonstrate the approximate
satisfaction of the conditions of Theorem 4.13, is shown in [80] to lead to a new
family of Selberg integral formulas. See [46] for a discussion of their importance.
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Remark 4.18. Note that the assumptions of Theorem 4.13 are extremely weak.
In plain words, Theorem 4.13 implies that if the probability of observing the
data can be arbitrary small under priors contained in A that are putting mass
near the extreme values of Φ, then the optimal bounds on posterior values are
the extreme values of Φ in A (even if the data comes in the form of a large
number of samples and the set of priors is highly constrained). Example 4.16
illustrates that one consequence of Theorem 4.13 is that Bayesian posteriors are
not robust, and in fact are fragile with respect to the choices of priors constrained
by marginals, even with a highly constrained subset of priors of M(A).
Moreover, if Π is convex, then by considering priors of the form π0λ+(1−λ)π1
with π0, π1 ∈ Π, π0 ·D[B] > 0 and π1 ·D[B] > 0, it is easy to see that the Bayesian
posterior can take any value in the interval (L(A),U(A)), irrespective of the
data. In addition, it is easy to observe that even including the quantity of interest
Φ in the marginal Ψ does not prevent this fragility. Theorem 4.13 also leads to
the following apparent paradoxes when the Bayesian framework is applied to
the space A: (1) Posteriors with different priors may diverge as more and more
data comes in; (2) When the sample data is observed with some (say Gaussian)
measurement noise of variance σ2, then, the optimal bound U(Ψ−1(Q)|B) on the
quantity of interest Φ converges towards U(Ψ−1(Q)) as σ2 →∞. That is, if one
interprets optimal bounds on posterior values as uncertainty bounds, then one
would reach the paradoxical conclusion that adding measurement uncertainty
decreases the uncertainty of the quantity of interest. The idea of the proof of
this assertion is based on the following observation:
Let y be the (noisy) measurement whose distribution given the value of the
data d is assumed to be independent of µ. Write pσ(d)[B] for the probability
that the value of y belongs to a set B and observe that the conditional value of
the quantity of interest Φ given the y ∈ B is equal to
Eπ
[
Φ(µ)Ed∼D(µ)
[
pσ(d)[B]
]]
Eπ
[
Ed∼D(µ)
[
pσ(d)[B]
]] . (64)
We deduce that if pσ(d)[B]/pσ(d
′)[B] converges towards one as the level of noise
σ →∞ uniformly in (d, d′) ∈ [0, 1]2 (which is the case if the data in Example 4.9
is observed with Gaussian noise of increasing variance, see also Example 4.19
below), then (64) converges towards the prior value of Φ as σ → ∞ uniformly
in π.
The fact that optimal bounds on prior values may become less precise after
conditioning is known as the dilation phenomenon in robust Bayesian inference
[103], and, in some sense, the brittleness results presented in this paper could
be seen as an extreme occurrence of this phenomenon.
Example 4.19. Consider again Example 4.9 with the set of admissible priors
π on A defined as the collection
Π :=
{
π ∈ M(A) ∣∣Eµ∼π[Eµ[X ]] = q} .
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and the map Dn corresponding to the observation of n i.i.d. samples of µ. For q ∈
(0, a), letQ be the set of probability measuresQ on [0, 1] such that Eq′∼Q[q′] = q.
Let Q be the probability measure on [0, 1] with probability density function
p(x) = (1− q)/q on [0, q] and p(x) = q/(1− q) on (q, 1]. It is easy to check that
Q ∈ Q, that
Eq′∼Q
[
inf
µ∈A :Eµ[X]=q′
n∏
i=1
µ[Bi]
]
= 0, (65)
and that, for all δ > 0,
Pq′∼Q
[
sup
µ∈A :Eµ[X]=q′,
∏
n
i=1 µ[Bi]>0
Eµ[X ] > 1− δ
]
> 0. (66)
It follows from Theorem 4.13 that
U(Ψ−1Q∣∣B) = 1. (67)
5. Bayesian robustness and consistency
It is appropriate at this point to place the results of Sections 3 and 4 in the
more well-established context of two key questions about Bayesian inference,
namely its robustness with respect to perturbations of the prior (and likelihood
and observed data), and its frequentist consistency. This discussion will also
motivate Section 6, where we show that Bayesian inference can be profoundly
non-robust even under arbitrarily small local perturbations in total variation
and Prokhorov metrics.
5.1. Bayesian robustness
The robust Bayesian viewpoint appears to have been introduced independently
by Box [25] and Huber [58]; see e.g. [15, 16] and Chapter 15 of [60] for surveys
of the field. In the robust Bayesian approach, a class Π of priors and a class
Λ of likelihoods together produce a class of posteriors by pairwise combination
through Bayes’ rule. Robust Bayesian methods are a subclass of the methods
of imprecise probability; the idea that the probability of an event need not be a
single real number has a history stretching back to Boole [24] and Keynes [65],
with more recent and comprehensive foundations laid out in e.g. [68, 100, 105].
One way of generating such a class Π of priors is via a belief function, as in
[104] and Dempster–Shafer theory more generally. The belief function framework
encompasses prior probabilities whose values are known only on some finite
partition of the probability space, and not the whole σ-algebra; classes of ε-
contaminated priors can also be represented in this way, as well as classes of
locally perturbed priors. The belief function approach has the useful feature that
explicit formulae can be given for the lower and upper posterior probabilities of
events [104, Theorem 4.1].
Another typical approach to generating a class Π might be to consider a finite-
dimensional parametrized class of models. For example, one could consider,
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instead of a single Gaussian prior on R of specified mean and variance, a two-
parameter class of Gaussian priors with a range of means and variances, or
a three-parameter class of skew-Gaussian priors. Similarly, one might consider
a two-parameter class of beta distributions instead of a uniform prior on a
bounded interval.
However, a danger in specifying a finite-dimensional class Π of priors is that
one is making very strong statements about the form of the priors, particularly
with regard to the tails, that cannot be justified based on often-limited amounts
of prior information. For example, if all the priors π ∈ Π have thin tails, then the
class Π will have a very difficult time modeling events that lie in those tails, even
when exposed to data from those regions. This problem is particularly impor-
tant in applied fields such as catastrophe modeling, insurance, and re-insurance,
in which the catastrophic events of interest are by definition high-impact low-
probability “Black Swan” events: the difference between an exponentially small
and an inverse-polynomially small tail can be vitally important. Also, because
members of a finite-dimensional parametric family Π of priors often have sim-
ilar qualitative properties (such as being mutually absolutely continuous), the
apparently broader perspective does not not add much to the asymptotic pos-
terior picture in terms of robust consistency, although it does provide a broader
understanding given finitely many samples.
Rather than specifying a finite-dimensional Π, it is epistemologically more
reasonable to specify a finite-codimensional Π, for example by specifying inter-
val bounds on the expected values of finitely many observed test functions (i.e.
generalized moment inequalities); this setting encompasses the finite-partition
belief function framework mentioned above. Calculation of optimal prior and
posterior bounds on quantities of interest is often an exercise in numerical op-
timization [20, 82, 90] rather than closed-form formulae.
One consequence of Theorems 4.8 and 4.13 is that the very same Bayesian
sensitivity analysis framework that produces the robustness results of classical
robust Bayesian inference under finite-dimensional classes of priors also leads to
brittleness results under finite-codimensional classes of priors, when the set of
all priors is infinite dimensional. As illustrated by (8) and Example 4.10, The-
orems 4.8 and 4.13 can also be used to obtain robustness/stability results by
adding sufficiently strong constraints (at the expense of learning) on the prob-
ability of the data in the model class. As discussed in Subsection 1.4, Example
4.10 suggests that posterior stability and learning are antagonistic properties in
Bayesian inference under finite information.
5.2. Motivation for Bayesian inconsistency and model
misspecification
To motivate Section 6 and interpret the results of this paper in relation to
the issue of convergence of posterior values in Bayesian inference we will now
analyse and review questions of Bayesian consistency, inconsistency and model
misspecification. There is, of course, a large literature on these topics, and we
will not attempt to be exhaustive in providing references; rather, our aims are:
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first, to give a short reminder on how Bayesian inference is currently employed in
Uncertainty Quantification (UQ); second, to identify issues and popular beliefs
about what one actually learns from Bayesian inference, and thereby motivate
the results of this paper; and, last, to present sufficient references that the
interested reader can find technical justification for the formal manipulations of
this subsection.
In this subsection, we are interested in estimating Φ(µ†) where Φ is a known
quantity of interest function and µ† is an unknown (or partially known) prob-
ability measure on X . For the purposes of exposition, in this subsection, we
assume that X = Rk. One example of a quantity of interest, when X = R, is
Φ(µ†) := µ†[X ≥ a] (the probability that the random variable X distributed
according to µ† exceeds the threshold value a). We also assume that we are
given n independent samples d1, . . . , dn, each distributed according to µ
†.
We will now present the parametric Bayesian answer to this problem. For
the purposes of exposition, in this section, we restrict our attention to paramet-
ric Bayesian inference. We first introduce {µ( · , θ)}θ∈Θ a family of probability
distributions on X parametrized by θ ∈ Θ (and commonly referred to as the
model class). For the sake of simplicity here we also assume that Θ = Rℓ. Let
A0 :=
{
µ( · , θ) ∣∣ θ ∈ Θ}.
Note that A0 is a subset ofM(X ) that may or may not contain µ†. If µ† /∈ A0,
then the model is said to be misspecified ; otherwise, the model is said to be well
specified.
We next introduce p0 ∈ M(Θ), a probability distribution on Θ (the prior
distribution on θ). Let π0 be the push-forward (measure) of p0 under the map
θ 7→ µ( · , θ) (see [23, 22], Sections 3.6, 3.7) and observe that π0 is a probability
distribution on A0, i.e. π0 ∈ M(A0), and that π0 is the distribution of the
random measure µ( · , θ) when θ is distributed according to p0.
The next step is then to estimate Φ(µ†) via conditioning. Let pn ∈ M(Θ)
be the posterior distribution of θ given the observation of the i.i.d. samples
d1, . . . , dn, as obtained using Bayes’ formula, and let πn be the push-forward of
pn. The Bayesian estimate of Φ(µ
†) is therefore
Eµ∼πn [Φ(µ)]. (68)
For the purposes of exposition, we assume that the measures µ( · , θ) and µ†
are all absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure and write
f( · , θ) and f † for their densities, which we assume to be continuous. Similarly,
we assume that the measure p0 is absolutely continuous with respect to the
Lebesgue measure and, abusing notation, write p0 for both the measure p0
and its (continuous) density, and similarly for pn( · ), the posterior density of θ
on Θ given the observation the samples d1, . . . , dn. We will now examine the
convergence properties of the sequence of posterior densities pn(θ) as n → ∞.
This analysis being classical (see for instance [79] and references therein), our
purpose is not to provide rigorous justifications but rather to familiarize the
reader with the mechanisms regarding the convergence of posteriors.
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We have
pn(θ) =
p0(θ)
∏n
j=1 f(dj , θ)∫
Θ p0(θ
′)
∏n
j=1 f(dj , θ
′) dθ′
≡ p0(θ)
∏n
j=1 f(dj , θ)
Ep0 [
∏n
j=1 f(dj , · )]
which we write as
pn(θ) =
p0(θ)e
nLn(θ)∫
Θ p0(θ
′)enLn(θ′) dθ′
≡ p0(θ)e
nLn(θ)
Ep0 [e
nLn( · )] ,
where
Ln(θ) :=
1
n
n∑
j=1
log f(dj , θ).
Recall that
∏n
j=1 f(dj , θ) is commonly known as the likelihood and Ln(θ) as the
(sample) average log-likelihood.
Consistency and the large-sample limit Now observe that if log f(dj , θ) is
integrable then it follows from the Law of Large Numbers that Ln(θ) converges
almost surely, as n→∞, to the expected log-likelihood L(θ) defined by
L(θ) :=
∫
X
f †(x) log
(
f(x, θ)
)
dx. (69)
Assuming that L(θ) has a unique maximizer θ∗ ∈ Θ (corresponding to the
asymptotic limit of the maximum likelihood estimator (MLE), as the number of
data points goes to infinity)and that p0 is strictly positive in every neighborhood
of θ∗, it follows under regularity assumptions on f (or local strict convexity in
the neighborhood of θ∗) that pn(θ) converges, almost surely, as n→∞, towards
a Dirac mass supported at θ∗. Therefore, assuming Φ to be sufficiently regular,
the Bayesian posterior estimate of Φ(µ†), i.e.,∫
Θ
Φ
(
µ( · , θ))pn(θ) dθ, (70)
converges almost surely as n→∞ to
Φ
(
µ( · , θ∗)). (71)
Note that
L(θ) = Ent(f †)−DKL
(
f †
∥∥f( · , θ)),
where Ent(f †) := − ∫X f †(x) log f †(x) dx is the entropy of f † and DKL denotes
the Kullback–Leibler divergence defined by
DKL
(
f †
∥∥f( · , θ)) := Ex∼f† [log f †(x)f(x, θ)
]
.
It follows that θ∗ is also the minimizer of DKL(f †‖f( · , θ)) with respect to θ, i.e.
the MLE θ∗ is characterized by the property that µ( · , θ∗) is the distribution
having minimal relative entropy to µ† in the model class {µ( · , θ)}θ∈Θ.
An immediate consequence of this observation is the fact if the model is not
misspecified, i.e. if µ† is an element µ( · , θ†) of the model class, then θ∗ = θ†,
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µ( · , θ∗) = µ†, and the Bayesian estimate (70) is asymptotically exact in the
limit as n→∞. In this situation, the Bayesian estimate is said to be consistent.
This convergence result is known as the Bernstein–von Mises Theorem (see
for instance [79, Theorem 5]) or as the Bayesian Central Limit Theorem, since
the limiting posterior can even be described in a more refined way as being
asymptotically normal and not just a point mass. The condition that every open
neighborhood of θ† has strictly positive p0-probability (or, even more strongly,
that the prior be globally supported) has been named Cromwell’s Rule3 by
Lindley [72].
Recent results [30, 61, 71, 79] on the Bernstein–von Mises phenomenon show
a notable dependence of the validity of the Bernstein–von Mises property upon
subtle geometrical and topological details, and regularity properties of the model
and the data-generating distribution. Therefore, it is to be expected that any
general stability condition for Bayesian inference would have to take account of
such factors.
What happens when the model is misspecified? To provide an illustra-
tive answer to this question, consider the family of Gaussian models {f( · , θ) |
θ = (c, σ) ∈ R× R+}, where
f(x, c, σ) =
1
σ
√
2π
exp
(
− (x− c)
2
2σ2
)
.
What will happen when this model is exposed to data coming from a potentially
non-Gaussian truth µ†, with density f †, that has a well-defined mean c† and
standard deviation σ†? By the above considerations, θ∗ maximizes the expected
log-likelihood (69) with respect to θ, and the expected log-likelihood is simply
L(θ) = −
∫
R
f †(x)
(x − c)2
2σ2
dx− (log σ)
∫
R
f †(x) dx − log
√
2π. (72)
A quick calculation using partial derivatives shows that θ∗ = (c∗, σ∗) maxi-
mizes (72) if and only if c∗ = c† and σ∗ = σ†. That is, the Bayesian estimate
(68) of Φ(µ†), for any distribution µ† of mean c† and standard deviation σ†,
converges almost surely as the number of sample data goes to infinity, towards
Φ(µ( · , (c†, σ†))), where µ( · , (c†, σ†)) is the unique Gaussian distribution on R
with mean c† and standard deviation σ†.
However, now there is a problem: there are many different probability distri-
butions µ on R that have the same first and second moments as µ† but have, say,
different higher-order moments, or different quantiles. Predictions of those other
moments or quantiles using µ( · , (c†, σ†)) can be inaccurate by orders of magni-
tude. A trivial, albeit extreme, example is furnished by Φ(µ) := Eµ[|X − cµ| ≥
tσµ] (where cµ and σµ denote the mean and standard deviation of µ). Under
3Since the posterior cannot possibly concentrate on a point outside the support of the
prior, having a globally-supported prior and hence not ruling out a priori any θ ∈ Θ as a
possible θ† can be seen as a Bayesian version of Oliver Cromwell’s famous injunction to the
Synod of the Church of Scotland in 1650: “I beseech you, in the bowels of Christ, think it
possible that you may be mistaken.”
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the Gaussian model, (defining erf(z) := 1√
2π
∫ z
−∞ e
− t2
s dt as the error function)
P
[|X − cµ| ≥ tσµ] = 1 + erf (− t√
2
)
,
whereas the extreme cases that prove the sharpness of Chebyshev’s inequality —
in which the probability measure is a discrete measure with support on at most
three points in R — have
P
[|X − cµ| ≥ tσµ] = min{1, 1
t2
}
.
In the case of the archetypically rare “6σ event”, the ratio between the two
is approximately 1.4 × 107. This is, of course, an almost perversely extreme
comparison: it would be obvious to any observer with only moderate amounts
of sample data that the data were being drawn from a highly non-Gaussian
distribution. However, it is not inconceivable that the true distribution µ† has
a Gaussian-looking bulk but tails that are significantly fatter than those of
a Gaussian, and the difference may be difficult to establish using reasonable
amounts of sample data; yet, it is those tails that drive the occurrence of “Black
Swans”, catastrophically high-impact but low-probability outcomes. The results
of this paper suggest that this situation is generic, and cannot be avoided no
matter how many moments or integrals of arbitrary test functions of the truth
µ† are matched nor how “close” µ† is to the class {µ( · , θ)}θ∈Θ.
5.3. Bayesian inconsistency and model misspecification
To quote [79], “[w]hile for a Bayesian statistician the analysis ends in a certain
sense with the posterior, one can ask interesting questions about the the proper-
ties of posterior-based inference from a frequentist point of view.” Many of these
questions are asymptotic in nature: for example, in the limit of infinitely many
independent µ†-distributed samples, will the posterior converge in a suitable
sense to µ† regardless of the initial choice of prior π? This property is referred
to as consistency4; a general survey of consistency results is found in [99]. As
noted above, the consistency theorem is generically known as the Bernstein–von
Mises theorem [19, 96], although the earliest rigorous proofs are due to Doob
[38] and Le Cam [69].
Unfortunately, Cromwell’s Rule is only necessary, and not sufficient, to ensure
consistency. In fact, consistency is far from being a generic property, and once
the probability space contains infinitely many points (and hence any parameter
space Θ that parametrizes all probability measures on that probability space
is infinite-dimensional), inconsistency is not the exception, but the rule [36]. In
[48, Sec. 5], Freedman considered a countable index set N := {1, 2, . . .} and the
4Sometimes the term frequentist consistency is used, reflecting the fact that it lies outside
the strict Bayesian worldview.
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parameter space
Θ :=
{
θ : N→ [0, 1]
∣∣∣∣∣∑
i∈N
θ(i) = 1
}
.
Each θ gives rise to a probability distribution Pθ = µ( · , θ) under which the
observationsX1, X2, . . . are IID with Pθ[Xn = i] = θ(i). The problem is assumed
to be well-specified, so that one particular θ† ∈ Θ is considered to be the “true”
parameter value, and the frequentist data-generating distribution is µ† = Pθ† =
µ( · , θ†). Theorem 5 of [48] shows that, when supp(µ†) is infinite, given any
“spurious” probability distribution Q = Pq, there exists a prior probability
measure π on Θ that has θ† in its support, such that the posterior of π µ†-a.s.
concentrates on q in the limit of observing infinitely many i.i.d. µ†-distributed
samples. In fact, there is a prior that gives positive mass to every open subset
of Θ but yields consistent posterior estimates for only a first-category set of
possible “true” (data-generating) parameter values θ†.
There are conditions on priors that can ensure frequentist consistency in
infinite-dimensional or non-parametric contexts, e.g. the tail-free priors intro-
duced by Freedman in [48] and hybrid Bayesian–frequentist tools such as Dirich-
let process priors [52]. However, while the collection of “bad” priors that lead
to inconsistent results is measure-theoretically small [38, 28], it is topologically
generic [49].
Remark 5.1. It is probably fair to say that, despite their popularity and doc-
umented successes, Bayesian methods have always attracted some degree of
controversy and opposition: see e.g. [51] and rejoinders for a recent academic
discussion, and [73, 78] for less formal treatments. Often, this opposition is
philosophical in nature, particularly with regard to the subjective interpreta-
tion of the probabilities involved, which is something that remains counter-
intuitive to many commentators: see [44, par. 35 & 37] for a recent example
in law. However, there are also analytical reasons to be careful about the ap-
plication of Bayesian methods [88, 76, 43]. It is, in fact, now well understood
that Bayesian methods may fail to converge or may converge towards the wrong
solution if the underlying probability mechanism allows an infinite number of
possible outcomes [35] and that, in these non-finite-probability-space situations,
this lack of convergence (commonly referred to as Bayesian inconsistency) is the
rule rather than the exception [36]. There is now a wide literature of positive
[19, 30, 38, 67, 69, 96, 92] and negative results [12, 35, 48, 47, 61, 71] on the
consistency properties of Bayesian inference in parametric and non-parametric
settings, and an emerging understanding of the fine topological and geometrical
properties that determine (in)consistency.
It is important to appreciate that the requirement of positive prior mass in
every neighborhood of the true distribution depends upon the topology placed
upon M(X ). For example, Schwartz [86] shows that every π that puts positive
mass on all Kullback–Leibler (relative entropy) neighborhoods of µ† is weakly
consistent. On the other hand, Freedman [48] and Diaconis & Freedman [35]
show that π may put positive mass on all weak neighborhoods of µ† and still fail
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to be weakly consistent — e.g. by not being tail-free. Nor are results limited to
weak convergence of the posterior to µ†. For example, [9] shows that consistency
holds in the Hellinger distance if π puts positive mass on all Kullback–Leibler
neighborhoods of µ† and certain smoothness and tail conditions are satisfied;
see [98, 101] for further results on Hellinger and Kullback–Leibler consistency.
The amount of prior probability mass that lies Kullback–Leibler-close to the
truth, quantified using a notion called thickness, can be used to quantify the
convergence properties of Bayes estimates [1, 2, 74]. However, it is important
to note that, in the infinite-dimensional contexts that are increasingly subject
to Bayesian analyses, results like the Feldman–Ha´jek dichotomy [45, 56] suggest
that probability measures are ‘usually’ mutually singular and ‘rarely’ mutually
absolutely continuous, and so the Kullback–Leibler neighborhoods of µ† are
‘small’ sets that are ‘unlikely’ to intersect the model class.
The situation in which there is no θ† ∈ Θ such that µ† = µ( · , θ†) is referred
to as model misspecification. The consistency and other asymptotic properties
of misspecified models appear to have first been considered by Berk [17, 18] and
Huber [59]. See [66, 67] for a recent contribution, and [74] for convergence rates.
“In practice, Bayesian inference is employed under misspecification all the time, partic-
ularly so in machine learning applications. While sometimes it works quite well under
misspecification [21, 66], there are also cases where it does not [31, 50], so it seems im-
portant to determine precise conditions under which misspecification is harmful — even if
such an analysis is based on frequentist assumptions.” [53]
There is a reasonable popular belief that gross misspecification of the model
will be detected by some means before engaging in a serious Bayesian analysis;
indeed there do exist tests [57, 106] for model misspecification, but it is impor-
tant to note that while one can determine that the model is misspecified, one
cannot be sure that the model is well-specified. There is also an understandable
popular belief that these tests mean that one need only be concerned with the
situation of “mild misspecification”, and that provided µ† lies “close enough”
to the model class {µ( · , θ)}θ∈Θ, the posterior estimates will still converge to a
usefully informative limit.
Remark 5.2. This belief echoes G. E. P. Box’s statement [26, p. 424] that
“essentially, all models are wrong, but some are useful” and question [26, p. 74]
“Remember that all models are wrong; the practical question is how wrong do
they have to be to not be useful?”
In terms of the above discussion, one purpose of this paper is to explore
the extent to which one can simultaneously have robust Bayesian analyses that
produce consistent answers, given that the models used (both priors and likeli-
hoods) are certain to be misspecified to some degree. Can one be “just a little bit
wrong” in terms of model misspecification? Our results suggest that the answer
is negative within the classical framework of Bayesian Sensitivity analysis, when
“closeness” is measured in terms of total variation and Prokhorov metrics or in
terms of a finite (but possibly large) number of marginals of the data generating
distribution.
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In particular, one aim of Section 6 is to show that this belief is wrong if
“mild misspecification” is measured using the Prokhorov or the total variation
metrics, the number of samples is finite (but possibly arbitrarily large), and if
convergence is required to hold uniformly in an arbitrarily small neighborhood
of the model.
Remark 5.3. It is known from the Bernstein–von Mises theorem [19, 96] that,
in finite-dimensional situations, posterior values converge towards the quantity
of interest if the prior distribution has strictly positive mass in every neighbor-
hood of the truth (see also [69, 79]). It is also known that “even for the simplest
infinite-dimensional models, the Bernstein–von Mises theorem does not hold”
[32, 47]. This possible lack of convergence, referred to as the consistency prob-
lem, has been at the center of a debate between frequentists and Bayesians. We
quote Diaconis and Freedman [35] (see also [36])
“If the underlying mechanism allows an infinite number of possible outcomes (e.g., esti-
mation of an unknown probability on the integers), Bayes estimates can be inconsistent:
as more and more data comes in, some Bayesian statisticians will become more and more
convinced of the wrong answer.”
What is the significance of Theorem 4.13 in that discussion? To answer this
question, consider Example 4.9 (and 4.19), in which one is interested in esti-
mating the probability (under the unknown measure µ†) that X exceeds a after
observing n independent samples. We already know from [35, 32] that placing
priors on the infinite-dimensional space A =M[0, 1] of probability measures on
[0, 1] is unlikely to lead to Bayesian posteriors that will converge towards the
true value as more and more data comes in. One strategy to circumvent this
lack of convergence would be to consider a finite-dimensional subset of A, i.e.
a family (µλ) of probability measures on [0, 1] indexed by a finite-dimensional
parameter λ ∈ Rk, put a strictly positive prior p on λ ∈ Rk, and then invoke the
Bernstein–von Mises theorem to guarantee the convergence of posterior values.
However, the Bernstein–vonMises theorem requires that the true distribution
under which the data is sampled belongs to {µλ | λ ∈ Rk}, the parametrized
finite-dimensional subset of A. What happens when this is not the case, i.e. the
situation of misspecification? Write πp for the push-forward of the prior p on
λ ∈ Rk to a prior on A under the map λ 7→ µλ. Assume that the data have
been sampled from π† · D where π† is the (frequentist) true distribution. Here
Theorem 4.13, as illustrated in Example 4.16, can be used to show that the
posterior values of the quantity of interest under πp and π
† may lie near the
opposite extreme values of Φ in A even if (1) π† is a Dirac mass on a measure
µ† ∈ A; (2) the number of independent samples is large; and (3) k is large and
k moments of µ† and µλ∗ are equal for some λ∗ ∈ Rk.
Remark 5.4. One popular method for detecting failure of convergence under
model misspecification is to divide the data into data used for calibrating the pa-
rameters of the model and data used for validating the accuracy or predictability
of the (calibrated) model. This approach, oftentimes described as “frequentist”
[55, 11], could be used to validate Bayesian calculations [43]. Although the de-
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tection (of the lack of predictability of the model) is asymptotically robust, it
requires the availability of sufficient data.
6. Brittleness under local misspecification
The purpose of this section is to present brittleness results with respect to local
perturbations in the total variation and Prokhorov metrics. Thus, whereas the
examples given for Theorem 4.13 highlighted that no finite number of common
moments would be sufficient to constrain two priors to give nearby posterior
value for the quantity of interest, this section shows that closeness in the TV
and Prokhorov metrics is also insufficient to ensure robustness.
We now establish a corollary to the proof of Theorem 4.13 which we will
then use to establish an extreme brittleness theorem for a model with local
misspecification. Recall that, for a map Ψ: A → Q, a map ψ : Ψ(A) → A is
called a section of Ψ if Ψ ◦ ψ(q) = q for all q ∈ Ψ(A).
Theorem 6.1. Let A be a Suslin space, let Φ: A → R be measurable, let Q be a
separable and metrizable space, and let Ψ: A → Q measurable. Let Q ⊆M(Q)
be such that supp(Q) ⊆ Ψ(A) for all Q ∈ Q. Let the data space D be metrizable
and consider B ∈ B(D). Assume that D is such that all the level sets of Ψ go to
zero, in the sense that
inf
µ∈Ψ−1(q)
D(µ)[B] = 0, for all q ∈ Ψ(A). (73)
Then for any positive measurable section ψ of Ψ, positive in the sense that
D(ψ(q))[B] > 0, for all q ∈ Ψ(A), (74)
it follows that
U(Ψ−1Q∣∣B) ≥ Q∞(Φ ◦ ψ). (75)
where Q∞(Φ ◦ ψ) is the essential supremum
Q
∞(Φ ◦ ψ) := sup
Q∈Q
inf
{
r ∈ R : Q[Φ ◦ ψ > r] = 0}. (76)
See Figure 3 for an illustration of Theorem 6.1.
We now use Theorem 6.1 to develop a brittleness theorem for a model
with local misspecification. To that end, let X be a Polish space so that, by
[4, Thm. 15.15], M(X ) endowed with the weak topology is Polish. Moreover,
by [40, Thm. 11.3.3], we know that if we select a complete consistent metric d
for X , then the Prokhorov metric dM defined by
dM(µ1, µ2) := inf {ε > 0 |µ1(A) ≤ µ2(Aε) + ε for all A ∈ B(X )} ,
where
Aε := {x ∈ X | d(x, x′) < ε for some x′ ∈ A}
is the ε neighborhood of A, metrizes the weak topology on M(X ). Moreover,
Prokhorov’s theorem [40, Cor. 11.5.5] asserts that the Prokhorov metric dM
is a complete metric for the Polish space M(X ). For α > 0, µ ∈ M(X ), let
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Fig 3. Illustration of Conditions (73) and (74) of Theorem 6.1. If, for some data map D ∈ D,
all level sets of Ψ go to zero (i.e. for all q ∈ Ψ(A), infµ∈Ψ−1(q) D(µ)[B] = 0), then, for any
positive section ψ of Ψ (i.e. Ψ ◦ ψ(q) = q and D(ψ(q))[B] > 0 for q ∈ Ψ(A)), the least upper
bound on posterior values is bounded from below by the essential supremum of Φ ◦ ψ.
Bα(µ) := {µ′ ∈ M(X ) | dM(µ, µ′) < α} be the open ball of Prokhorov radius
α about µ.
Let Θ be a Polish space and let the model define a map
P : Θ→M(X ).
As in Section 5.2, the image P(Θ) is referred to as the (Bayesian) model class.
Remark 6.2. When P is continuous, it follows from the definition [5, Sec. 3.2]
of an analytic set that the the image P(Θ) ⊆ M(X ) is analytic, and since the
range space M(X ) is Polish it follows that P(Θ) is Suslin. Actually, continuity
is not required, since [5, Thm. 3.3.4] implies that if P is measurable, then the
image P(Θ) is Suslin. If, in addition, P is injective, then Suslin’s Theorem
[5, Thm. 3.2.3] implies that P(Θ) is Borel.
Assume that P is measurable and denote its image by A0 := P(Θ). Let
πΘ ∈ M(Θ) be a prior distribution on Θ and let π0 := PπΘ ∈ M(A0) be its
pushforward. Let Φ0 : M(X )→ R be a measurable quantity of interest. We are
interested in estimating Φ0 using the prior π0 and our purpose is to show the
extreme brittleness of this estimation under arbitrarily small perturbations of
the model class A0 in both the Prokhorov and total variation metrics.
For conditioning on observations, let the data space be D := Xn, and consider
the n-i.i.d. sample data map Dn0 : M(X )→M(Xn) defined by
Dn0µ := µ
n, µ ∈M(X ). (77)
For xn = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Xn, dropping the notational dependence, denote the
rectangle about xn by
Bnδ :=
n∏
i=1
Bδ(xi), (78)
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Fig 4. The original model class A0 (black curve) is enlarged to its metric neighborhood Aα
(shaded). This procedure determines perturbations µα ∈ Aα of the original random measure
µ0 ∈ A0.
where Bδ(xi) is the open ball of radius δ about xi. Observe that the prior value
of Φ0 under π0 is Eπ0 [Φ0] and its posterior value under the observation d ∈ Bnδ
is Eπ0⊙Bn
δ
Dn
0
[Φ0].
To define α-perturbations of the model class A0 in Prokhorov metric, we in-
troduce, for α > 0 the α-neighborhood Aα ⊆M(X ) of A0 defined by (see Fig-
ure 4)
Aα :=
⋃
µ∈A0
Bα(µ). (79)
It is easy to see that the ball fibration (see Remark 6.8)
A := {(µ1, µ2) ∈M(X )×M(X ) | µ1 ∈ A0, µ2 ∈ Bα(µ1)} (80)
of the set of balls about points of A0 projects to
P0A = A0 (81)
PαA = Aα (82)
where P0 : M(X )×M(X )→M(X ) is the projection onto the first component
and Pα the projection onto the second. The naturally induced set of priors
corresponding to π0 ∈M(A0) is therefore the set Πα ⊂M(Aα) defined by
Πα :=
{
πα ∈M(Aα)
∣∣∃π ∈ M(A) with P0π = π0 and Pαπ = πα}. (83)
Remark 6.3. Observe that each element πα ∈ Πα is the distribution of a
random measure µ2 on Aα such that: (i) there exists a random measure µ1 ∈ A0
with distribution π0 (that of the model); (ii) (µ1, µ2) is jointly measurable; and
(iii) with probability one the Prokhorov distance from µ2 to µ1 is less than α,
i.e. dM(µ1, µ2) < α. Observe in particular that π0 ∈ Πα.
Our main result is provided in Theorem 6.9 but for the sake of clarity we will
first give this result in the following (simpler) form.
Theorem 6.4. Using the notations introduced above and the data map (77),
let Πα be defined as in (83). If
lim
δ↓0
sup
x∈X
sup
θ∈Θ
P(θ)[Bδ(x)] = 0, (84)
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then, for all α > 0 there exists δc(α) > 0 such that for all 0 < δ < δc(α), all
n ∈ N, and all (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Xn
U(Πα|Bnδ ) ≥ ess supπ0(Φ0),
where
ess supπ0(Φ0) := inf{r > 0 | π0[φ0 > r] = 0},
and with similar expressions for the lower bounds L.
Remark 6.5. Theorem 6.4 implies the extreme brittleness of Bayesian infer-
ence under local misspecification. Indeed, assume that the model class A0 is
well specified (i.e. it contains the truth µ†) and that, therefore, the Bayesian es-
timator described by π0 is consistent. One may believe that a model A1 lying in
a ‘small enough’ neighborhood of A0 should have good convergence properties,
Theorem 6.4 and Remark 6.3 invalidate this belief, at least as far as the TV
and Prokhorov notions of ‘small enough’ are concerned. Using the notations of
Remark 6.3, observe in particular that an unscrupulous practitioner may design
a model corresponding to a random measure µ2 such that the distance between
µ1 (the well specified model) and µ2 is a.s. at most α (where α is arbitrarily
small) and the posterior value using the random measure µ2 is as distant as
possible from the posterior value using µ1 irrespective of the sample size n.
Remark 6.6. Observe that the condition (84) is extremely weak and satisfied
for most Bayesian models. This condition can in fact be made weaker by replac-
ing it with the assumption that for n sufficiently large it holds true that for all
θ, P(θ) does not contain a Dirac mass in each ball Bδ(xi) (i.e. on the sample
data when δ ↓ 0). We also note that the proof of Theorem 6.4 does not require
the samples to be i.i.d., in particular, the same results can be obtained with
coupled samples, if, for instance, the data map Dn0 is replaced by a data map
D such that Cn1
∏n
i=1 µ(Ai) ≤ D(µ)[A1 × · · · ×An] ≤ Cn2
∏n
i=1 µ(Ai) for strictly
positive constants C1 and C2.
Remark 6.7. Theorem 6.4 is a corollary of Theorem 6.9 and the proof of
Theorem 6.9 shows that, if Θ is compact and P is continuous and Φ(µ) := µ(A)
for some fixed A ∈ B(X ), then the result of Theorem 6.4 also holds when
using the total variation distance dTV instead of the Prokhorov distance, which
produces a much smaller neighborhood.
However, in this metricM(X ) in general is not separable and this introduces
measurability difficulties. These difficulties can be overcome somewhat when
Θ is compact and P is continuous, since the image of a compact set under a
continuous map is compact and therefore measurable. Moreover, validation or
certification type quantities of interest defined by Φ(µ) := µ(A) for some fixed
A ∈ B(X ) are easily seen to be continuous and therefore measurable. Moreover,
because of continuity,
Π∞0 (Φ0) ≈ Π∞α (Φ0).
Our motivation in working mainly with the Prokhorovmetric lies in the fact that
we also seek to lay down measurability foundations for the scientific computation
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of optimal statistical estimators where the unknown quantities are products of
functions and measures and for such spaces the total variation metric is too
strong for the measurability of standard quantities of interest.
We will now give a more general version of Theorem 6.4 and elaborate on
the objects entering in its formulation. We start with ΠΘ ⊆ M(Θ), a set of
admissible priors and let
Π0 := PΠΘ ⊆M(A0)
denote the push-forward by the model P . We consider the pull-back ΦΘ :=
Φ0 ◦P , of the measurable quantity of interest Φ0 : M(X )→ R, to a measurable
quantity of interest ΦΘ : Θ → R. Then the change of variables formula [40,
Thm. 4.1.11] implies that, for πΘ ∈ M(Θ),
EπΘ [ΦΘ] = EπΘ [Φ0 ◦ P ] = EPπΘ [Φ0]
whenever either side is well defined. Therefore, taking suprema and infima, we
obtain
U(ΠΘ) = U(Π0),
L(ΠΘ) = L(Π0),
where we note that the quantity of interest implicit in these definitions is deter-
mined by the argument. For α > 0, define Aα, A, P0 and Pα as in (79), (80),
(81) and (82).
Remark 6.8. Using the affine convexity of M(X ), one can show that A is
indeed a Hurewicz fibration, in that it has the homotopy lifting property, see
e.g. [91, p. 66]. Let
d−1M (< α) := {(µ1, µ2) | dM(µ1, µ2) < α}
denote the set of all pairs of measures at Prokhorov distance at most α from one
another. Since dM : M(X )×M(X )→ R is continuous, it follows that d−1M (< α)
is open and therefore Borel. In addition, since A0 ⊆ M(X ) is Suslin it follows
that A0 ×M(X ) ⊆M(X )×M(X ) is Suslin. Therefore, since A = d−1M (< α) ∩
(A0 ×M(X )), it follows that A is Suslin.
Observe that the measurable quantity of interest Φ0 : M(X ) → R acting on
the second component of M(X ) ×M(X ), naturally pulls back to the quantity
of interest Φ: M(X ) ×M(X ) → R by Φ := Φ0 ◦ Pα, and we have supAα Φ0 =
supAΦ and infAα Φ0 = infAΦ, i.e.
U(Aα) = U(A),
L(Aα) = L(A).
For a subset Π0 ⊆ M(A0), the projection identity (81) implies that the set
Π := P−10 Π0 defined by P
−1
0 Π0 := {π ∈ M(A) | P0π ∈ Π0} is the induced
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set of probability measures on A. Moreover, for π ∈ Π, the change of variables
formula
Eπ [Φ] = Eπ[Φ0 ◦ Pα] = EPαπ[Φ0]
implies that
sup
π∈Π
Eπ[Φ] = sup
πα∈PαΠ
Eπα [Φ0],
inf
π∈Π
Eπ[Φ] = inf
πα∈PαΠ
Eπ[Φ0],
so that
PαΠ = PαP
−1
0 Π0 ⊆M(Aα)
is the induced set of probability measures on Aα. Let us denote this induced set
by
Πα := PαP
−1
0 Π0, (85)
so that these equalities become
U(Π) = U(Πα),
L(Π) = L(Πα).
For conditioning on observations, define Dn0 as in (77) and pull it back to the
data map Dn : M(X )×M(X )→M(Xn) defined by Dn := Dn0 ◦Pα. Define Bnδ
as in (78) and recall the definition (43)
Eπ⊙Dn
[
Φ
∣∣Bnδ ] = E(µ1,µ2)∼π[Φ(µ1, µ2)Dn(µ1, µ2)[Bnδ ]]
E(µ1,µ2)∼π
[
Dn(µ1, µ2)[Bnδ ]
] .
of the conditional expectation and the corresponding (47) upper value
U(Π|Bnδ ) := sup
π⊙Dn∈Π⊙Bn
δ
Dn
Eπ⊙Dn
[
Φ
∣∣Bnδ ]
in terms of the admissible set (45)
ΠBn
δ
:=
{
π ∈ Π : (π · Dn)[Bnδ ] > 0
}
of product measures, where the marginal is defined by
(π · Dn)[Bnδ ] := E(µ1,µ2)∼π
[
Dn(µ1, µ2)[B
n
δ ]
]
.
Let us indicate the dependence on some measure π of the essential supremum
of some quantity of interest Φ by
π∞(Φ) := inf {r ∈ R |π{Φ > r} = 0}
and, for a set Π of measures, let
Π∞(Φ) := sup
π∈Π
π∞(Φ). (86)
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For πα = Pαπ with π ∈ Π, we have
πα[Φ0 > r] =
(
Pαπ
)
[Φ0 > r]
= π[Φ0 ◦ Pα > r]
= π[Φ > r]
so that we conclude that
Π∞(Φ) = Π∞α (Φ0).
Let us now quantify a type of regularity for the model P . For x ∈ X , let
B0(x) := {x} and define
P∞(δ) := sup
x∈X
sup
θ∈Θ
P(θ)[Bδ(x)], for δ ≥ 0.
It is clear that P∞ : R+ → [0, 1] is an increasing function. Moreover, for most
parametric families, it is easy to show that P∞ is continuous and P∞(0) = 0,
and for many of them not difficult to find useful upper bounds.
Finally, let us assume that the model P is positive, in that µ(Bδ(x)) > 0
for all µ ∈ A0, x ∈ X , and δ > 0. Theorem 6.4 is a direct consequence of the
following theorem.
Theorem 6.9 (Brittleness under Local Misspecification). With the notation
and assumptions above, let Πα be defined as in (85), and let δ > 0 and 0 < α < 1
satisfy
P∞(δ) < α.
Then, using Dn0 for the distribution of the data, for all integers n ≥ 1,
U(Πα|Bnδ ) ≥ Π∞0 (Φ0)
with similar expressions for the lower bounds L.
Remark 6.10. When Cromwell’s rule (see Section 5.2) is implemented (i.e. if
the prior measure of every non-empty neighborhood is strictly positive), it fol-
lows that Π∞0 (Φ0) = U(A0) so that the conclusion of Theorem 6.9 becomes
U(Πα|Bnδ ) ≥ U(A0).
Remark 6.11. Theorem 6.9 provides conditions sufficient to guarantee how bad
things can get regardless of how many samples are taken. One might hope that
when these conditions are not satisfied, that more samples may prove beneficial.
However, when the condition
inf
(µ,µ′)∈Ψ−1µ
Dn(µ, µ′)[Bnδ ] = 0, µ ∈ A0
of Theorem 6.1 is only approximately satisfied, the inequality
Dn(µ, µ′)[Bnδ ] =
(
µ′
)n
[Bnδ ] =
n∏
i=1
µ′[Bδ(xi)]
and the quantitative version of Theorem 4.13 (given in [80, Thm. 3.1], see also
[80, Rmk. 3.2]) imply that things actually get ‘worse’ with more samples.
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7. Conclusions and further developments
In this paper, we have looked at the robustness of Bayesian Inference in the clas-
sical framework of Bayesian Sensitivity Analysis. In that (classical) framework,
the data is fixed, and one computes optimal bounds on (i.e. the sensitivity of)
posterior values with respect to variations of the prior in a given class of priors.
Although robustness is already well established when the class of priors is finite
dimensional, we observe that, under general conditions, when the class of priors
is finite codimensional, the optimal bounds on posterior values are as large as
possible, no matter the number of data points. Our motivation for specifying
a finite codimensional class of priors is to look at what classical Bayesian sen-
sitivity analysis would conclude under finite information, and the best way to
understand this notion of “brittleness under finite information” is through the
simple example provided in Subsection 1.2.
The mechanism causing this “brittleness” has its origin in the fact that, in
classical Bayesian sensitivity analysis, optimal bounds on posterior values are
computed after the observation of the specific value of the data, and that the
probability of observing the data under some feasible prior may be arbitrar-
ily small (the example given in Subsection 1.3 provides an illustration of this
phenomenon). This data dependence of worst priors is inherent to this classical
framework and the resulting brittleness under finite information can be seen as
an extreme occurrence of the dilation phenomenon (the fact that optimal bounds
on prior values may become less precise after conditioning) observed in classical
robust Bayesian inference [103]. Although these worst priors do depend on the
data, “look nasty”, and make the probability of observing the data very small,
they are not “isolated pathologies” but directions of instability (of Bayesian
conditioning) and their number increase with the number of data points. The
example given in Subsection 1.4 provides an illustration of this point and also
suggests that learning and robustness are, to some degree, antagonistic proper-
ties: a strong constraint on the probability of the data makes the method robust
but learning impossible and, as the constraint is relaxed, learning becomes pos-
sible but posterior values become brittle.
Since “brittleness under finite information” appears to be inherent to classi-
cal Bayesian Sensitivity Analysis (in which worst priors are computed given the
specific value of the data), one may ask whether robustness could be established
under finite information by exiting the strict framework of Robust Bayesian In-
ference and computing the sensitivity of posterior conclusions independently of
the specific value of the data. To investigate this question, Hampel and Cuevas’
notion of qualitative robustness has been generalized in [81] to Bayesian inference
based on the quantification of the sensitivity of the distribution of the posterior
distribution with respect to perturbations of the prior and the data generating
distribution, in the limit when the number of data points grows towards infinity.
Note that, contrary to classical Bayesian Sensitivity Analysis considered here,
in the qualitative formulation the data is not fixed and posterior values are
therefore analyzed as dynamical systems randomized through the distribution
of the data. To express finite information, the total variation, Prokhorov, and
Ky Fan metrics have been used to quantify perturbations and sensitivities.
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Since this notion of qualitative robustness is established in the limit when the
number of data points grows towards infinity, it is natural to expect that the
notion of consistency (i.e. the property that posterior distributions convergence
towards the data generating distribution) will play an important role. Although
consistency is primarily a frequentist notion, it is also equivalent to intersubjec-
tive agreement which means that two Bayesians will ultimately have very close
predictive distributions. Therefore, it also has importance for Bayesians. Fortu-
nately, not only are there mild conditions which guarantee consistency, but the
Bernstein–von Mises theorem goes further in providing mild conditions under
which the posterior is asymptotically normal. The most famous of these are
Doob [38], Le Cam and Schwartz [70], and Schwartz [86, Thm. 6.1]. Moreover,
the assumptions needed for this consistency are so mild that one can be lead to
the conclusion that the prior does not really matter once there is enough data.
For example, we quote Edwards, Lindeman and Savage [42]:
“Frequently, the data so completely control your posterior opinion that there is no practical
need to attend to the details of your prior opinion.”
To some, the consistency results appeared to generate more confidence than
possibly they should. We quote A. W. F. Edwards [41, p. 60]:
“It is sometimes said, in defence of the Bayesian concept, that the choice of prior distri-
bution is unimportant in practice, because it hardly influences the posterior distribution
at all when there are moderate amounts of data. The less said about this ’defence’ the
better.”
[81] shows that the Edwards defence is essentially what produces non quali-
tative robustness in Bayesian inference. In particular, the assumptions required
for consistency (e.g. the assumption that the prior has Kullback–Leibler sup-
port at the parameter value generating the data) are such that arbitrarily small
local perturbations of the prior distribution (near the data generating distribu-
tion) results in consistency or non-consistency, and therefore have large impacts
on the asymptotic behavior of posterior distributions. These mechanisms are
different and complementary to those discovered by Hampel and developed by
Cuevas, and they suggest that consistency and robustness are, to some degree,
antagonistic requirements (a careful selection of the prior is important if both
properties, or their approximations, are to be achieved) and also indicate that
misspecification generates non qualitative robustness.
In conclusion, the exploration of Bayesian inference in a continuous world
has revealed both positive and negative results. However, positive results re-
garding the classical or qualitative robustness of Bayesian inference under finite
information have yet to be obtained. To that end, observe that the example
provided in Subsection 1.4 suggests that there may be a missing stability condi-
tion for Bayesian inference in a continuous world under finite information akin
to the CFL condition for the stability of a discrete numerical scheme used to
approximate a continuous PDE. Although numerical schemes that do not satisfy
the CFL condition may look grossly inadequate, the existence of such perverse
examples certainly does not imply the dismissal of the necessity of a stability
condition. Similarly, although one may, as in the example provided in Subsec-
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tion 1.3, exhibit grossly perverse worst priors, the existence of such priors does
not invalidate the need for a study of stability conditions for using Bayesian In-
ference under finite information. The example of Subsection 1.4 suggests that, in
the framework of Bayesian Sensitivity Analysis, under finite information, such a
stability condition would strongly depend on how well the probability of the data
is known or constrained in the model class in addition to the class of priors and
the resolution of the measurements. It is natural to expect that such robust-
ness and stability questions will increase in importance as Bayesian methods
increase in popularity due to the availability of computational methodologies
and environments to compute the posteriors. Indeed, when posterior distribu-
tions are approximated using such methods, the robustness analysis naturally
includes not only quantifying sensitivities with respect to the data generating
distribution and the choice of prior, but also the analysis of convergence and
stability of the computational method. This is particularly true in Bayesian
updating where Bayes’ rule is applied iteratively and computed posterior dis-
tributions become prior distributions for the next iteration. Oftentimes these
posterior distributions (which are then treated as prior distributions) are only
approximated (e.g. via MCMC methods) and the Brittleness results discussed
here and in [81] suggest that having strong convergence (of these MCMC meth-
ods) in TV would not be enough to ensure stability. At a higher level, these
results appear to suggest that robust inference (in a continuous world under fi-
nite information) should be done with reduced/coarse models rather than highly
sophisticated/complex models (and the level of “coarseness/reduction” would
depend on the available “finite information”).
8. Proofs
8.1. Proof of Theorem 3.6
For q ∈ Rn, define
Π(q) := Ψ−1Q = {π ∈ M(A) |Eπ [Ψ] = q}
and let Π(q, n) := Π(q) ∩∆(n) ⊆ Π(q) be the subset consisting of (n + 1)-fold
convex combinations of Dirac masses. Using a ‘layercake’ approach, we use the
fact that
Π(Z) =
⋃
q∈Z
Π(q) and Π(Z, n) =
⋃
q∈Z
Π(q, n),
while applying Theorem 3.4 with equality constraints Π(q), q ∈ Rn, and the
fact that the supremum over a union is a supremum of suprema to obtain a
reduction as follows:
U(Π(Z)) = U
⋃
q∈Z
Π(q)

= sup
q∈Z
U(Π(q))
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= sup
q∈Z
U(Π(q, n))
= U
⋃
q∈Z
Π(q, n)

= U(Π(Z, n)),
which completes the proof.
8.2. Proof of Lemma 3.10
Since T ⊂ Q is a subset of a separable metrizable space, [4, Cor. 3.5] implies
that it is itself separable and metrizable. Consider the set-valued map with
non-empty values Ψ−1 : T ։ A with graph G defined by
G := {(q, µ) ∈ T ×A |Ψ(µ) = q} . (87)
Let d be a metric that generated the topology of T and define h : T × A → R
by h(q, µ) := d(Ψ(µ), q). Then, since d is continuous in each of its arguments, it
follows that h is a Carathe´odory function, as defined in Definition A.2. Since T is
separable and metrizable, Lemma A.3 implies that h is B(T )⊗B(A)-measurable.
Rewriting Equation (87) as
G := {(q, µ) ∈ T ×A |h(q, µ) = 0}
yields that G belongs to B(T )⊗ B(A). Lemma A.1 (through the identification
S = A, s = µ, ϕ(t, s) = Φ(µ)) implies that the function U ◦Ψ−1 : T → R defined
for q ∈ T by q 7→ supµ∈Ψ−1(q) Φ(µ) is B̂(T )-measurable, thereby establishing
the first assertion. The second assertion then follows from the second part of
Lemma A.1.
8.3. Proof of Theorem 3.11
For the first assertion, consider Q ∈ Q. Then, by the second assertion of
Lemma 3.10, there exists a B̂(suppQ)-measurable section ψ of Ψ, i.e. there ex-
ists a B̂(supp(Q))-measurable function ψ : supp(Q)→ A such that Ψ(ψ(q)) = q
for all q ∈ supp(Q). Let Q also denote its restriction to its support and Q̂ its
completion. Let π := ψQ̂ ∈M(A), so that, for all A ∈ B(supp(Q)),(
Ψπ
)
(A) =
(
ΨψQ̂
)
(A)
=
(
(Ψ ◦ ψ)Q̂)(A)
= Q̂(A)
= Q(A).
Hence, Ψπ = Q, establishing the first assertion.
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For the main assertion, observe that, for all µ ∈ A,(U ◦Ψ−1 ◦Ψ)(µ) = sup
µ′:Ψ(µ′)=Ψ(µ)
Φ(µ′) ≥ Φ(µ). (88)
Consequently, for Q ∈ Q, the first assertion shows that there is a π such that
Ψπ = Q, so that a change of variables (Proposition A.7) and the monotonicity
properties (Proposition A.4) of these integrals, together with the inequality (88),
imply that
EQ[U ◦Ψ−1] = EΨπ[U ◦Ψ−1]
= Eπ[U ◦Ψ−1 ◦Ψ]
≥ Eπ[Φ],
and therefore
EQ[U ◦Ψ−1] ≥ sup
π∈Ψ−1Q
Eπ [Φ].
Consequently,
sup
Q∈Q
EQ[U ◦Ψ−1] ≥ sup
π∈Ψ−1Q
Eπ[Φ] = U(Ψ−1Q)
and, in particular,
sup
Q∈Q
EQ[U ◦Ψ−1] ≥ U(Ψ−1Q). (89)
To obtain the reverse inequality, for δ > 0 consider Q ∈ Q and apply Lemma
3.10 to conclude that there exists a δ-optimal B̂(supp(Q))-measurable section
of Ψ; that is, a B̂(supp(Q))-measurable function ψ : supp(Q) → A such that
Ψ(ψ(q)) = q for all q ∈ supp(Q) and (Φ ◦ ψ)(q) > (U ◦ Ψ−1)(q) − δ for all
q ∈ supp(Q). Now let π := ψQ̂ ∈ M(A), and observe from the proof of the
first assertion that Ψπ = Q, and therefore π ∈ Ψ−1Q. Therefore, by a change
of variables,
Eπ[Φ] = EψQ̂[Φ]
= E
Q̂
[Φ ◦ ψ]
> E
Q̂
[U ◦Ψ−1]− δ.
Since, by definition, EQ[U ◦Ψ−1] := EQ̂[U ◦Ψ−1], it follows that
U(Ψ−1Q) = sup
π∈Ψ−1Q
Eπ[Φ]
≥ sup
Q∈Q
EQ[U ◦Ψ−1]− δ.
Since δ > 0 was arbitrary, it follows that
U(Ψ−1Q) ≥ sup
Q∈Q
EQ[U ◦Ψ−1].
Recalling the reverse inequality (89), we obtain the main assertion.
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The assertion of measure affinity follows from Lemma A.9.
For the assertion (52), define
Π := {π ∈ M(A) |Eπ[ψi] = 0 for i = 1, . . . , n} .
Let ǫ > 0. Assume that supπ+∈Π+ Eπ+ [Φ] > λ and that π+ ∈ Π+ is such
that Eπ+ [Φ] > λ. Observe that π := π+/π+(A) is an element of Π that satisfies
Eπ[Φ−λψ0] > 0. Define Πn as in (27) and apply [82, Thm. 4.1] to supπ∈Π Eπ[Φ−
λψ0] to conclude that there exists π
∗ ∈ Πn such that Eπ∗ [Φ − λψ0] > 0. Since
Φ−λψ0 = (ϕ−λ)ψ0 and ψ0 is positive, it also follows that Eπ∗ [ψ0] > 0. Writing
π∗+ := π
∗/Eπ∗ [ψ0] we obtain that π∗+ ∈ Π+,n and Eπ∗+ [Φ] > λ, which concludes
the proof of (52).
8.4. Proof of Lemma 4.1
Consider the set
Y ′ :=
⋃
{Oy | Oy ⊆ Y is open and ν(Oy) = 0} .
First let us show that E = Y ′. To see this, first observe that trivially we have
E ⊆ Y ′. Now suppose that y ∈ Y ′. Then there exists a y′ ∈ Y and an open
Oy′ ∋ y′ such that y ∈ Oy′ and ν(Oy′) = 0. Therefore, y ∈ E and hence E = Y ′.
Now, since Y ′ is a union of open sets, it is open and therefore measurable.
Moreover, since Y is strongly Lindelo¨f, it follows that Y ′ is Lindelo¨f and that the
open cover of Y ′ by ν-null open sets used in the definition of Y ′ has a countable
subcover, so that
Y ′ =
⋃
i∈N
Oyi
where each Oyi is open and has ν(Oyi) = 0. It follows that
ν(E) = ν(Y ′) ≤
∑
i∈N
ν(Oyi) = 0
and the proof is finished.
8.5. Proof of Theorem 4.7
The first assertion, (51), follows by layering the set of positive measures of finite
total mass as
⋃
r∈R+{rM(A)}, using the fact that the supremum over a union
is a supremum of suprema, and applying the reduction theorem [82, Thm. 4.1]
in rM(A) separately.
For the second assertion, (52), define
Π := {π ∈M(A) |Eπ [ψi] = 0 for i = 1, . . . , n}
Let ǫ > 0. Assume that supπ+∈Π+ Eπ+ [Φ] > λ and that π+ ∈ Π+ is such
that Eπ+ [Φ] > λ. Observe that π := π+/π+(A) is an element of Π that satis-
fies Eπ [Φ − λψ0] > 0. Defining Πn as in (27) and applying [82, Thm. 4.1] to
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supπ∈Π Eπ [Φ − λψ0], we deduce that there exists π∗ ∈ Πn such that Eπ∗ [Φ −
λψ0] > 0. Since Φ − λψ0 = (ϕ − λ)ψ0 and ψ0 is positive, it also follows that
Eπ∗ [ψ0] > 0. Let π
∗
+ := π
∗/Eπ∗ [ψ0] to obtain that π∗+ ∈ Π+,n and Eπ∗+ [Φ] > λ,
which concludes the proof of (52).
8.6. Proof of Theorem 4.8
First, we prove that
U(Π(q)|B) = sup
π+∈Π+(q)
Eµ∼π+
[
Φ(µ)D(µ)[B]
]
, (90)
where Π+(q) is the set of positive finite measures π+ on A such that Eπ+ [Ψ(µ)−
q] = 0 and Eπ+ [D(µ)[B]] = 1. To that end, first observe that
U(Π(q)|B) = sup
π∈Π(q):π⊙D[B]>0
Eπ⊙D
[
Φ
∣∣B]
and that, for any π ∈ Π(q) such that π ⊙ D[B] > 0,
Eπ⊙D
[
Φ
∣∣B] = Eµ∼π[Φ(µ)D(µ)[B]]
Eµ∼π
[
D(µ)[B]
] . (91)
Now consider π ∈ Π(q) such that π ⊙ D[B] > 0. Then π+ := π/Eπ[D(µ)[B]] is
an element of Π+(q) and (91) implies that
Eπ⊙D
[
Φ
∣∣B] = Eµ∼π+[Φ(µ)D(µ)[B]].
Conversely, if π+ ∈ Π+(q), then π := π+/π+[A] is an element of Π(q) such that
π ⊙ D[B] > 0 and
Eµ∼π+
[
Φ(µ)D(µ)[B]
]
=
Eµ∼π
[
Φ(µ)D(µ)[B]
]
Eµ∼π
[
D(µ)[B]
] .
Since the above argument also shows that Π(q)⊙B D is nonempty if and only if
Π+(q) is nonempty, (90) follows. The right hand side of (90) is a linear program
in π+, so Theorem 4.7 implies that the supremum in π+ can be achieved by
assuming π+ to be the weighted sum of at most n + 1 Dirac masses, i.e. by
assuming that
π+ =
n∑
i=0
αiδµi . (92)
This finishes the proof of Theorem 4.8.
8.7. Proof of Theorem 4.11
First let us show that, for λ ∈ R, the statement that
Eπ⊙D[Φ|B] > λ, π ∈ (Ψ−1(Q))B (93)
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is equivalent to the statement that
Eµ∼π
[(
Φ(µ)− λ)D(µ)[B]] > 0. (94)
To that end, assume (93) and observe that the definition (45) of (Ψ−1(Q))B
implies that π · D[B] > 0, where, by (46),
π · D[B] := Eµ∼π
[
D(µ)[B]
]
. (95)
Consequently, by (43),
Eπ⊙D
[
Φ
∣∣B] = Eµ∼π[Φ(µ)D(µ)[B]]
Eµ∼π
[
D(µ)[B]
] > λ,
and the denominator is strictly positive. Therefore,
Eµ∼π
[(
Φ(µ)− λ)D(µ)[B]]
= Eµ∼π
[
Φ(µ)D(µ)[B]
] − λEµ∼π[D(µ)[B]]
> 0,
and (94) follows. Conversely, assume (94) and observe that π ·D[B] > 0. To see
this, observe that, if π ·D[B] = 0, then (95) implies that D(µ)[B] = 0 π-a.s. and
so
Eµ∼π
[(
Φ(µ)− λ)D(µ)[B]] = 0,
which is a contradiction. Consequently, π ·D[B] > 0 and dividing the assumption
Eµ∼π
[(
Φ(µ)− λ)D(µ)[B]]
= Eµ∼π
[
Φ(µ)D(µ)[B]
] − λEµ∼π[D(µ)[B]]
> 0
by π · D[B] := Eµ∼π[D(µ)[B]] throughout yields (93) and the equivalence is
established.
The main assertion now follows from a direct application of Theorem 3.11. Fi-
nally, since Φ is semibounded, it follows that µ 7→ Φ(µ)D(µ)[B] is semibounded
and measurable, and the measure-affinity assertion follows from Lemma A.9.
8.8. Proof of Theorem 4.13
Let us first establish that the assumptions of the theorem are well defined.
To that end, note that Lemma 3.10 implies that q 7→ infµ∈Ψ−1(q) D(µ)[B] is
B̂(supp(Q))-measurable and hence (58) is well defined. Similarly (59) is well
defined.
For the proof of the theorem, fix δ > 0, let Q ∈ Q and D ∈ D sat-
isfy the assumptions, and define λ := U(A) − δ. Since (Φ(µ) − λ)D(µ)[B] is
bounded and measurable, Lemma 3.10 implies that the function q 7→ θ(q) :=
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supµ∈Ψ−1(q)(Φ(µ)−λ)D(µ)[B] is B̂(supp(Q))-measurable. Moreover, (58) implies
that the function θ is non-negative with Q-probability one and (59) implies that
θ is strictly positive on a subset of strictly positive Q-measure. Hence,
Eq∼Q
[
sup
µ∈Ψ−1(q)
(Φ(µ)− λ)D(µ)[B]
]
= EQ[θ] > 0,
and, therefore,
sup
Q∈Q
Eq∼Q
[
sup
µ∈Ψ−1(q)
(Φ(µ)− λ)D(µ)[B]
]
> 0.
It then follows from Theorem 4.11 that U(Ψ−1Q|B) ≥ λ = U(A) − δ. Since
δ > 0 was arbitrary, it follows that U(Ψ−1Q|B) ≥ U(A). Theorem 4.5 implies
that
U(Ψ−1Q|B) ≤ U(A)
and the theorem follows.
8.9. Proof of Theorem 6.1
We will need the following notation: for an admissible set Π ⊆M(A) of priors,
an observation map D, and an open subset B ⊆ D, let Π ⊙B D be the set of
probability distributions π ⊙ D on A×D generated by π ∈ Π:
Π⊙B D := {π ⊙ D | π ∈ Π and (π · D)[B] > 0}.
We also define
U(Π⊙B D) := sup
π⊙D∈Π⊙BD
Eπ⊙D
[
Φ
∣∣B].
The proof follows from the proof of Theorem 4.13 as follows. Let δ > 0, and let
a measurable section ψ satisfy the assumptions. Define λ := Q∞(Φ◦ψ)− δ, and
the universally measurable function q 7→ θ(q) := supµ∈Ψ−1(q)(Φ(µ)−λ)D(µ)[B].
Then assumption (73) implies that the function θ is non-negative. It follows
from the definition (86) of Q∞(Φ ◦ ψ), and λ < Q∞(Φ ◦ ψ), that there is a
Q ∈ Q such that Φ ◦ ψ > λ with nonzero Q-measure. Since
θ(q) = sup
µ∈Ψ−1(q)
(Φ(µ)− λ)D(µ)[B]
≥ (Φ ◦ ψ(q)− λ)D(ψ(q))[B],
the positivity assumption (74) implies that θ is positive on a subset of positive
Q-measure. Hence,
Eq∼Q
[
sup
µ∈Ψ−1(q)
(Φ(µ)− λ)D(µ)[B]
]
= EQ[θ] > 0
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and, therefore,
sup
Q∈Q
Eq∼Q
[
sup
µ∈Ψ−1(q)
(Φ(µ)− λ)D(µ)[B]
]
> 0.
It then follows from Theorem 4.11 that
U(Ψ−1Q|B) ≥ λ = Q∞(Φ ◦ ψ)− δ.
Since δ > 0 was arbitrary, the assertion is proved.
8.10. Proof of Theorem 6.9
We appeal to the corollary, Theorem 6.1, to Theorem 4.13. To that end, let A
be defined as in (80), and let Q := A0, Ψ := P0, D := {Dn}.
Since Dn = Dn0 ◦ Pα is a pull-back,
(π · Dn)[Bnδ ] = E(µ1,µ2)∼π
[
Dn(µ1, µ2)[B
n
δ ]
]
= E(µ1,µ2)∼π
[
Dn0 ◦ Pα(µ1, µ2)[Bnδ ]
]
= Eµ2∼Pαπ
[
Dn0 (µ2)[B
n
δ ]
]
= (Pαπ · Dn0 )[Bnδ ],
from which we conclude that (Pαπ ·Dn0 )[Bnδ ] > 0 if and only if (π ·Dn)[Bnδ ] > 0,
and so conclude
Πα ⊙Bn
δ
Dn0 = Pα
(
Π⊙Bn
δ
Dn
)
,
where Pα acts on each component in the natural way. Moreover since Φ = Φ0◦Pα
is also a pull-back, for π ∈ Π, we have
Eπ⊙Dn
[
Φ
∣∣Bnδ ] = E(µ1,µ2)∼π[Φ(µ1, µ2)Dn(µ1, µ2)[Bnδ ]]
E(µ1,µ2)∼π
[
Dn(µ1, µ2)[Bnδ ]
]
=
E(µ1,µ2)∼π
[
Φ0 ◦ Pα(µ1, µ2) · Dn0 ◦ Pα(µ1, µ2)[Bnδ ]
]
E(µ1,µ2)∼π
[
Dn0 ◦ Pα(µ1, µ2)[Bnδ ]
]
=
Eµ2∼Pαπ
[
Φ0(µ2)D
n
0 (µ2)[B
n
δ ]
]
Eµ2∼Pαπ
[
Dn0 (µ2)[B
n
δ ]
]
= EPαπ⊙Dn0
[
Φ0
∣∣Bnδ ]
and so we conclude that
U(Π⊙Bn
δ
Dn) = U(Πα ⊙Bn
δ
Dn0 ). (96)
We will now need the following proposition
Proposition 8.1. Define the total variation metric dTV on M(X ) by
dTV(µ1, µ2) := sup
A∈B(X )
|µ1(A)− µ2(A)|.
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Consider B ∈ B(X ). Then for µ ∈M(X ) such that µ(B) < 1, we have
dTV(µ, µ|Bc) ≤ µ(B).
Proof. For A ∈ B(X ), we have
µ(A) − µ|Bc(A) = µ(A)− µ(A ∩B
c)
µ(Bc)
= µ(A ∩B) + µ(A ∩Bc)− µ(A ∩B
c)
µ(Bc)
= µ(A ∩B)− µ(B)
1− µ(B)µ(A ∩B
c)
and therefore
µ(A)− µ|Bc(A) ≤ µ(A ∩B) ≤ µ(B)
and
µ(A) − µ|Bc(A) ≥ − µ(B)
1− µ(B)µ(A ∩B
c)
≥ − µ(B)
1− µ(B)µ(B
c)
= −µ(B),
thus establishing the assertion.
For B ∈ B(X ) and µ ∈ M(X ) such that µ(B) < 1, the conditional measure
µ|Bc ∈M(X ) is defined by
µ|Bc(A) := µ(A ∩B
c)
µ(Bc)
, A ∈ B(X ).
It follows from Proposition 8.1 that dTV(µ, µ|Bc) ≤ µ(B) and since dM ≤ dTV
(see e.g. [60, Eq. 2.24]), we conclude that
dM(µ, µ|Bc) ≤ µ(B). (97)
Let Bδ := Bδ(x1) denote the ball about the first sample of x
n = (x1, . . . , xn).
Then, for µ0 ∈ A0, it follows from the assumptions that
dM(µ0, µ0|Bc
δ
) ≤ µ0(Bδ)
≤ P∞(δ)
< α
and therefore (
µ0, µ0|Bc
δ
) ∈ Ψ−1µ0.
Moreover, since
Dn(µ0,µ0|Bc
δ
)[B
n
δ ] =
(
µ0|Bc
δ
)n
[Bnδ ]
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≤ µ0|Bc
δ
[Bδ]
= 0,
we conclude that the condition (73)
inf
(µ0,µ′0)∈Ψ−1µ0
Dn(µ0, µ
′
0)[B
n
δ ] = 0
of Theorem 6.1 is satisfied for all µ0 ∈ A0.
Now consider the diagonal map ∆: M(X )→M(X )×M(X ) defined by
∆(µ) := (µ, µ), µ ∈ M(X ).
Since
Ψ ◦∆(µ) = P0 ◦∆(µ) = µ, for all µ ∈M(X ),
it follows, if we define ∆ on the first component of the productM(X )×M(X )
and then restrict to A0, that ∆ is a section of Ψ = P0. It is clearly measurable,
but also satisfies
Pα ◦∆(µ) = µ, for all µ ∈M(X ),
that is, Pα ◦∆ is the identity map from the first component of M(X )×M(X )
to the second. Then, for µ0 ∈ A0, the positivity of the model P implies that
Dn
(
∆(µ0)
)
[Bnδ ] = D
n
0 ◦ Pα
(
∆(µ0)
)
[Bnδ ]
= Dn0 (µ0)[B
n
δ ]
= (µ0)
n[Bnδ ]
=
n∏
i=1
µ0[Bδ(xi)]
> 0
so that the second condition (74) of Theorem 6.1 is satisfied for all µ0 ∈ A0.
Theorem 6.1 then asserts that
U(Ψ−1Π0 ⊙Bn
δ
Dn) ≥ Π∞0 (Φ ◦∆).
Moreover, since
Φ ◦∆ = Φ0 ◦ Pα ◦∆ = Φ0,
now as a function on the first component of M(X )×M(X ), and
Ψ−1Π0 = P−10 Π0 = Π,
we conclude that
U(Π⊙Bn
δ
Dn) ≥ Π∞0 (Φ0).
The identity U(Π⊙Bn
δ
Dn) = U(Πα ⊙Bn
δ
Dn0 ) of (96) then implies the assertion.
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Appendix
The following lemma is Lemma III.39 p. 86 of [29]. We also refer to p. 87 of
[29] for the existence of the measurable selection η (which is also derived from
Theorem III.38 p.85 of [29]). These results are related to Aumann’s measurable
section principle [7] (the extension to Suslin space is due to Sainte-Beuve [85]).
Lemma A.1. Let (T, T ) be a measurable space, S a Suslin space. ϕ : T×S → R¯
a T ⊗ B(S) measurable function and Γ a multifunction (i.e. a set-valued map)
from T to non-empty subsets of S whose graph G belongs to T × B(S). Then
1. the function
m(t) := sup{φ(t, x) | x ∈ Γ(t)}
is a T̂ -measurable function of t.
2. for δ > 0, there exists η, a T̂ -measurable function of t, such that η(t) ∈
Γ(t) and ϕ(t, η(t)) > m(t)− δ.
The following definition is Definition 4.50 in [4]:
Definition A.2. Let (S,Σ) be a measurable space, and let X and Y be topo-
logical spaces. A function h : S ×X → Y is a Carathe´odory function if:
1. for each x ∈ X , the function hx = h(., x) : S → Y is (Σ,B(Y ))-measurable;
and
2. for each s ∈ S, the function hs = h(s, .) : X → Y is continuous.
The following lemma is Lemma 4.51 in [4] (see also [29, p. 70]):
Lemma A.3. Let (S,Σ) be a measurable space, X a separable metrizable space,
and Y a metrizable space. Then every Carathe´odory function h : S ×X → Y is
jointly measurable.
A.1. Universally measurable functions
For a topological space T let B̂(T ) denote the σ-algebra of universally mea-
surable sets. For a measure µ, let µ̂ denote its completion. Here we state the
following proposition that allows us to define the expected value of B̂(T ) measur-
able functions with respect to Borel measures. In all statements in the following
proposition, the assertions follow when the integrals involved exist, in particular
for semibounded functions. The proof is straightforward but tedious and follows
from e.g. [39, Thm. pg. 37], the English version of [34, Ch. 2, pg. 49], and [29].
Proposition A.4. Let T be a topological space. Then we have
• For a measurable function f we have Eµ̂f = Eµf
• Let f be B̂(T )-measurable. Then there exist two measurable functions f
and f such that
f ≤ f ≤ f, µ(f 6= f) = 0
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and, for any such functions, we have
Eµ[f ] = Eµ̂[f ] = Eµ[f ]
• For a fixed µ, f 7→ Eµ̂[f ] defines an affine function on the cone of non-
negative B̂(T )-measurable functions
• For a fixed B̂(T )-measurable function f , the function M(T ) ∋ µ 7→ Eµ̂[f ]
is affine.
• Suppose that f1, f2 are B̂(T )-measurable non-negative functions such that
f1 ≤ f2. Then Eµ̂[f1] ≤ Eµ̂[f2] for all µ ∈ M(T ).
Proposition A.4 leads to the following definition for the expectation of B̂(T )-
measurable functions with respect to Borel probability measures on T :
Definition A.5. For a Borel probability measure µ ∈ M(T ), we define the
integral of a B̂(T )-measurable function f by
Eµ[f ] := Eµ̂[f ]
when the latter exists, where µ̂ is the completion of the measure µ as described
in [39, p. 37].
Recall that a carrier T for a probability measure Q ∈ M(Q) is a set T ∈
B(Q) such that Q(T ) = 1. For a carrier T , since T ∈ B(Q), it follows that
B(T ) = B(Q)∩T and we can define the trace measure QT ∈M(T ) by QT (A) :=
Q(A), A ∈ B(Q) ∩ T . The following proposition shows that the expectation of
a function can be defined with respect to measures which possess carriers upon
which the function is universally measurable:
Proposition A.6. Let S be a topological space, and suppose that f is B̂(T )-
measurable for each measurable T ⊆ S. Suppose also that Q ∈ M(S) has a
carrier T ⊆ S. Then, using Definition A.5, any such carrier T defines an ex-
pectation
EQT [f ] := EQ̂T [f ],
and this definition is independent of the carrier; that is, if T ′ ⊂ S is another
carrier, then
E
Q̂T ′
[f ] = E
Q̂T
[f ].
Moreover, this expectation satisfies the assertions of affinity and monotonicity
of Proposition A.4.
We also need a change of variables formula for expectations of universally
measurable functions.
Proposition A.7. Let X and Y be topological spaces, Ψ: X → Y a measurable
map and suppose that f : Y → R is B̂(Y ) measurable. Then f ◦ Ψ: X → R is
B̂(X)-measurable and, for π ∈ M(X),
EΨπ[f ] = Eπ[f ◦Ψ].
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For Suslin space X and a subset M ⊂ M(X ) let Σ(M) denote the smallest
σ-subalgebra of subsets of M for which the the evaluation map ν 7→ ν(B) is
measurable for all B ∈ B(X ). The following version of a result of von Weizsacker
& Winkler [97] as stated in [107, Thm. 3.1] will be useful to us:
Theorem A.8. Let X be a Suslin space, let f1, . . . , fn : X → R be measurable
functions, and let c1, . . . , cn ∈ R be given. Define
H :=
{
ν ∈ M(X ) ∣∣ fi is ν-integrable and Eν [fi] ≤ ci, for i = 1, . . . , n}
Then, for each ν ∈ H, there is a probability measure p on Σ(ext(H)) such that
ν(B) =
∫
ext(H)
ν′(B) dp(ν′), for all B ∈ B(X ). (98)
[107, Prop. 3.1] shows that if a measurable function f : X → R is integrable
with respect to all measures in H (allowing the values ∞ and −∞), then inte-
gration
F (ν) :=
∫
X
f dν
is measure affine per Definition 3.3. We need a slightly more general result:
Lemma A.9. Consider the situation of Theorem A.8, let f : X → R be a
semibounded universally measurable function. Then
F (ν) := Eν̂ [f ], for ν ∈ H,
is measure affine per Definition 3.3.
The next lemma extends [107, Thm. 2.1] to the case where the constraint
functions fi, for i = 1, . . . , n, are universally measurable:
Lemma A.10. Let X be Suslin, and fix universally measurable real-valued func-
tions f1, . . . , fn and constants c1, . . . , cn. Then
H :=
{
ν ∈M(X ) ∣∣ fi is ν̂-integrable and Eν̂ [fi] ≤ ci for i = 1, . . . , n} (99)
is convex and
ext(H) =
ν ∈ H
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
ν =
∑m
i=1 αiδxi , where m ≤ n+ 1,
αi ≥ 0, xi ∈ X for i = 1, . . . ,m,∑m
i=1 αi = 1, 1 ≤ m ≤ n+ 1, and the vectors(
f1(xi), f2(xi), . . . , fn(xi), 1
)
for 1 ≤ i ≤ m are linearly independent
 .
A.2. Proofs
A.2.1. Proof of Proposition A.6
Let T and T ′ be two carriers for Q ∈ M(S) and f a function such that fT and
fT ′ are B̂(t)- and B̂(T ′)-measurable respectively. Then Proposition A.4 implies
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that there are functions f1, f2 measurable on T and f
′
1, f
′
2 measurable on T
′
such that
f1 ≤ fT ≤ f2 QT (f1 6= f2) = 0
f ′1 ≤ fT ′ ≤ f ′2 QT ′(f ′1 6= f ′2) = 0
so that
E
Q̂T
[fT ] = EQT [f1]
E
Q̂T ′
[fT ′ ] = EQT ′ [f
′
1]
Now, it is easy to see that T ∩ T ′ is also a carrier and that we have
f1(x) ≤ f(x) ≤ f2(x), x ∈ T ∩ T ′
and
QT∩T ′(f1 6= f2) ≤ QT (f1 6= f2) = 0
so that we conclude from Proposition A.4 that
E
Q̂T∩T ′
[f ] = EQT∩T ′ [f1]
= EQT [f1]− EQT\T ′ [f1]
= EQT [f1]
= E
Q̂T
[f ]
and so conclude that
E
Q̂T∩T ′
[f ] = E
Q̂T
[f ].
By the same argument on T ′ we conclude that E
Q̂T∩T ′
[f ] = E
Q̂T ′
[f ] and therefore
the first assertion is proved. The assertions of affinity and monotonicity are
similarly straightforward.
A.2.2. Proof of Proposition A.7
Consider π ∈M(X) and its pushforward ν := Ψπ. By Proposition A.4 and the
assumptions, there exists two measurable functions f and f such that
f ≤ f ≤ f, ν(f 6= f) = 0
from which we conclude that
f ◦Ψ ≤ f ◦Ψ ≤ f ◦Ψ
and
0 = ν[f 6= f ]
= Ψπ[f 6= f ]
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= π[Ψ−1{f 6= f}]
= π[f ◦Ψ 6= f ◦Ψ]
so that we obtain
π[f ◦Ψ 6= f ◦Ψ] = 0.
Since π was arbitrary, it follows that f ◦ Ψ is B̂(X)-measurable. To obtain the
change of variables formula, compute
Eπ[f ◦Ψ] := Eπ̂[f ◦Ψ]
= Eπ[f ◦Ψ]
= EΨπ[f ]
and
EΨπ[f ] := EΨ̂π[f ]
= EΨπ[f ]
from which we conclude the change of variables formula
Eπ[f ◦Ψ] = EΨπ[f ],
which completes the proof.
A.2.3. Proof of Lemma A.9
Fix ν ∈ H and a probability measure p such that the barycentric formula (98)
holds. Proposition A.4 asserts that there are measurable functions f1 ≤ f ≤ f2
such that ν(f1 6= f2) = 0. Therefore, f2 − f ≥ 0, Eν̂(f2 − f) = 0, f − f1 ≥ 0,
and Eν̂(f − f1) = 0. Moreover, it is easy to see then we can make both f1 and
f2 semibounded. Therefore F is a well defined extended real valued function.
Moreover, [107, Prop. 3.1] asserts that the function ν 7→ Eν [fi] is measure affine
for i = 1, 2, and so
Eν [fi] =
∫
ext(H)
Eν′ [fi] dp(ν
′), for i = 1, 2.
Consequently, since ν[f1 6= f2] = 0, it follows that Eν [f2 − f1] = 0 so that
0 = Eν [f2 − f1] =
∫
ext(H)
Eν′ [f2 − f1] dp(ν′), for i = 1, 2,
and since f2 − f1 ≥ 0 it follows that
ν′[f2 6= f1] = 0, p-a.e.
and therefore
ν̂′[f 6= f1] = 0, p-a.e.
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Therefore we conclude that
F (ν) := Eν̂ [f ]
= Eν̂ [f1] + Eν̂ [f − f1]
= Eν̂ [f1]
= Eν [f1]
=
∫
ext(H)
Eν′ [f1] dp(ν
′)
=
∫
ext(H)
E
ν̂′
[f1] dp(ν
′)
=
∫
ext(H)
E
ν̂′
[f1] dp(ν
′) +
∫
ext(H)
E
ν̂′
[f − f1] dp(ν′)
=
∫
ext(H)
E
ν̂′
[f ] dp(ν′)
=
∫
ext(H)
F (ν′) dp(ν′),
and the assertion is proved.
A.2.4. Proof of Lemma A.10
Let us first establish that
ν̂1 + ν2 = ν̂1 + ν̂2, for all ν1, ν2 ∈ M(X ), (100)
α̂ν = αν̂, for all ν ∈M(X ). (101)
This follows from the fact that (ν1 + ν2)(N) = 0 if and only if νj(N) = 0 for
j = 1, 2 and the characterization of the completion ν̂ by
ν̂(B ∪ S) := ν(B), B ∈ B(X ), S ⊂ N, ν(N) = 0
as found, for example, in [6, p. 18]. For then, for such B and S,
ν̂1 + ν2(B ∪ S) = (ν1 + ν2)(B)
= ν1(B) + ν2(B)
= ν̂1(B ∪ S) + ν̂2(B ∪ S)
Now for the proof of the main assertion. Following the proof of [107, Thm. 2.1],
it is sufficient to show that for
K :=
{
ν ∈M(X ) ∣∣ fi is ν̂-integrable for i = 1, . . . , n},
we have
ext(K) := {δx, x ∈ X}, (102)
and that R+K ⊂ R+M(X ) is a lattice cone in its own ordering. For the first,
observe that since ext(M(X )) = {δx | x ∈ X} and that fi are δx-integrable for
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all i = 1, . . . , n, x ∈ X , it follows that
{δx | x ∈ X} ⊆ ext(K).
Now suppose that ν ∈ ext(K) is not a Dirac mass. Then, as in the proof that
the extreme points of M(X ) are the Dirac masses, see e.g. [4, Thm. 15.9], and
using the fact that the support of ν must contain 2 or more points, we can
decompose ν as a convex combination ν = αν1 + (1 − α)ν2 where ν1 6= ν2 and
α ∈ (0, 1). Moreover, from
ν̂ = αν̂1 + (1− α)ν̂2,
we conclude that fi being ν̂-integrable implies that fi is ν̂j-integrable for j = 1, 2
and i = 1, . . . , n. Consequently, νj ∈ K for j = 1, 2. Since ν was an extreme
point we conclude that ν1 = ν2 which is a contradiction, and (102) follows.
Now let us demonstrate that R+K is a lattice cone in its own ordering. To
that end, note that by [84, Lem. 10.4], it suffices to show that R+K ⊂ R+M(X )
is a hereditary subcone, in that ν1 ∈ R+K, ν2 ∈ R+M(X ) and ν1 − ν2 ∈ R+K
together imply that ν2 ∈ R+K. To that end, consider such ν1 and ν2. Then
(100) implies that ̂(ν1 − ν2) = ν̂1 − ν̂2 and so we conclude that
0 ≤ E ̂(ν1−ν2)[|fi|] = Eν̂1 [|fi|]− Eν̂2 [|fi|]
and therefore
Eν̂2 [|fi|] ≤ Eν̂1 [|fi|] <∞,
from which we conclude that ν2 ∈ R+K. Hence, R+K is a hereditary subcone,
and the assertion then follows as in the proof of [107, Thm. 2.1].
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